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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the joint and separate effects of Environmental (E), Social (S),
and Governance (G) scores on bank stability. Using a sample of European banks oper-
ating in 21 countries over 2005–2017, we find that the total ESG score, as well as its
sub-pillars, reduces bank fragility during periods of financial distress. This stabilizing
effect holds strongly for banks with higher ESG ratings. These results are confirmed by
a differences-in-differences (DID) analysis built around the introduction of the EU 2014
Non-Financial Reporting Directive (NFRD). Our evidence also reveals that, in times of
financial turmoil, the longer the duration of ESGdisclosures, the greater the benefits on
stability. Finally, we show that the ESG–bank stability linkages vary significantly across
banks’ characteristics and operating environments. Our findings are robust to selection
bias and endogeneity concerns. Overall, they support the regulatory effort in requiring
an enhanced disclosure of non–financial information.
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The global financial and European sovereign debt crises renewed the interest on firms’ engagement in Corporate
Social Responsibility (CSR).1 The recent literature on its effectiveness in enhancing firms’ performance is rich,
although results tend to be mixed (e.g. Lee and Faff 2009; Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh 2009; Oikonomou,
Brooks, and Pavelin 2012; Albertini 2013;Dixon-Fowler et al. 2013; Friede, Busch, andBassen 2015). In addition,
only a few studies focus on risk (Luo and Bhattacharya 2006; Bouslah, Kryzanowski, and M’Zali 2018) and for
banks these typically examine single CSR aspects, such as the environmental dimension (Gangi et al. 2019) and
governance (Berger, Imbierowicz, and Rauch 2016; Anginer et al. 2018).
Two main views explain the relationship between CSR and risk (Bouslah, Kryzanowski, and M’Zali 2018)2:
(i) the risk mitigation; and (ii) the overinvestment view. The former derives from a risk management argument
based on the stakeholder theory and the value created by moral capital (Godfrey, Merrill, and Hansen 2009; Luo
and Bhattacharya 2006). The latter originates from the agency theory and focuses on opportunistic managerial
behaviour: managers may improve sustainability scores for the sake of their own reputation as responsible social
citizens (Barnea and Rubin 2010). The two views offer opposite predictions: negative in the risk mitigation view,
by decreasing the probability of adverse events firms obtain greater resilience during shocks (such as a crisis and
an economic downturn); and positive in the overinvestment view due to managerial entrenchment.
In recent years, banks have increasingly perceived sustainability as a means to increase their reputation, and
also to promote trust and credibility (Schultz, Castelló, and Morsing 2013; Park, Lee, and Kim 2014). Whether
this ultimately mitigates the effect of the financial crisis has not yet been tested in the banking literature. In this
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study we conjecture that the channel through which this may occur is via bank stability, measured by default
risk.
This paper provides three main contributions to this stream of literature. First, despite several studies have
addressed the relationship between CSR and firm risk, ours is the first to consider the European banking sector
and to use a market-based measure of default risk (Distance to Default). The focus on Europe is especially
relevant, sincemany countries in this region pioneered sustainability practices, with EUbanks leading compared
to those headquartered elsewhere (Ho,Wang, and Vitell 2012). In addition, from a regulatory perspective, major
steps have been taken to enhance disclosures on non–financial information and diversity.
In 2014 the EU adopted the Non-Financial Reporting Directive (2014/95/EU) that required certain large
companies, including banks, to disclose information on the way they operate and manage social and environ-
mental challenges.More recently, the EUhas demonstrated a strong commitment to step up efforts to addressing
these issues.3 In addition, in October 2020, the European Banking Authority (EBA) issued a discussion paper
on the management and supervision of ESG risks for credit institutions and investment firms (EBA 2020). In
November 2020, the European Central Bank announced, after a public consultation, that banking stress tests
that will be held in 2022 will also include consideration of climate-related risks (ECB 2020). Similar initiatives
are currently under way also outside the European Union or are even developed at the global level by the bank-
ing industry itself. For example, the Climate Biennial Exploratory Scenario (CBES) in the UK, that assesses the
resilience of the financial system to climate risks (Bank of England 2021a)4; and the ‘Principles for Responsible
Banking’, that are a voluntary framework ensuring that banks’ strategy and practice align with the vision soci-
ety has set out for its future in the UN Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Climate Agreement. The
Principles are currently signed by 235 banks from 69 countries, representative of 60 trillion USD total assets.
Our second contribution to the literature is that we use the whole set of information provided by Environ-
mental, Social and Governance (ESG) scores as a proxy for CSR performance (Chang, Kim, and Li 2014; Eccles,
Ioannou, and Serafeim 2014; Kim, Li, and Li 2014; Sassen, Hinze, and Hardeck 2016). ESG scores are aggregate
variables resulting from weighting several heterogeneous indexes: Environmental (E), that includes sustainable
use of resources, emissions and innovation in reducing environmental footprints; Social (S), that comprises for
example, job satisfaction, workplace health and safety, diversity, equality and human rights; andGovernance (G)
activities, that includes for example compliance with best practices, equal treatment of shareholders, integration
of non–financial objectives in strategic and managerial decisions.
Thirdly, this paper explores the relationship between ESG scores and bank stability over a relatively long
period (2005–2017) that covers the global financial sub-prime and European sovereign debt crises. By means of
an interaction term, confirmed by the results of a series of robustness checks based on alternative measures, we
verify whether the effect on bank stability is affected by the economic cycle. To our knowledge, this is the first
study to provide a similar evidence.
We postulate that the ESG–bank stability linkage may reward higher scores, especially during crisis times.
This expectation is tested using a differences-in-differences (DID) framework built around the introduction
in 2014 of the EU’s Non-Financial Reporting Directive. Additionally, the relatively long-time span allows us to
investigate the impact of the duration of ESGdisclosures for each entity: this is the first empirical evidence on this
measure of banks’ ESG commitment. Finally, by adopting a heterogeneous cross–country sample of European
banks, we can assess whether the ESG–bank risk relationship is driven by other firms’ characteristics (e.g. size)
and a different operating environment (financial system orientation and per-capita income levels).
Our empirical results show that, when considering aggregated ESG scores, engagement in CSR practices is
associated with higher stability (i.e. lower default risk) during crises years. It also seems to encourage more
prudent banking activities, fostering more stable relationships with the financial community and enhancing
reputation. These aspects are crucial in mitigating the potential adverse impact of negative events that typically
occur during a crisis. We also find that all ESG sub–pillars participate to this association: the development of
environmental technologies and processes optimizing the use of resources; the fair treatment of the workforce;
banks’ responsibility to produce quality goods and services integrating the customers’ health, safety, integrity
and data privacy; a bank’s capacity to guarantee equal treatment of all shareholders and promoting anti-takeover
devices. Thus, bank management strategies that combine these practices seem able to mitigate bank instability
during financial slowdowns. Our results are robust to selection bias and endogeneity concerns. In addition, we
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show that the stabilizing effect observed in crisis years holds strongly for banks with higher ESG scores, through
a differences-in-differences setting. We also find that the longer the duration of ESG disclosures, the greater are
the benefits, implying that both the level and the commitment of a bank’s engagementmatter, even if disclosures
become mandatory.
Interestingly, our evidence indicates that the composite ESG score exerts a different impact on financial sta-
bility depending on banks’ characteristics and on differences in the operating environment. More specifically,
we observe that only the largest European banking groups subject to the EBA’s stress tests experience improve-
ments in financial stability during crisis periods. Finally, we find that ESG strategies are more beneficial in more
bank–oriented financial systems and in countries with higher per-capita income levels.
In terms of policy, our results support the European regulatory commitment on mandatory disclosures
on non–financial reporting for larger entities: how to improve such benefits and extend them also to smaller
institutions are open questions for both policy-makers and academic research.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and formulates our
hypotheses. Sections 3 describes the empirical methodology, the sample and the variables used. Section 4 dis-
cusses the main results. Additional analyses and robustness checks are presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6
concludes and offers some policy implications.
2. Literature review and hypotheses development
Over the past two decades, CSR received a growing interest from researchers, practitioners, and regulators. Most
published empirical studies focused on its role in terms of enhanced performance, assessing its impact within
and outside firms and measuring its multi–dimensional components. Evidence is not definitive and is subject
to several methodological difficulties (Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh 2009). Most empirical works tend to use
proxies that typically focus only on one aspect, such as employee satisfaction (Edmans 2011, 2012; Edmans, Li,
and Zhang 2014); environmental protection (Dowell, Stuart, and Yeung 2000; Konar and Cohen 2001); corpo-
rate philanthropy (Masulis and Reza 2015; Liang and Renneboog 2016); or consumer satisfaction (Luo and
Bhattacharya 2006; Servaes and Tamayo 2013). Only recently, research begun to exploit the greater level of
cross–firm and industry data availability and scope offered by ESG disclosure scores (Liang and Renneboog
2017).
Many studies analyse the implications of sustainable practices primarily within non–financial corporations
(Santis, Albuquerque, and Lizarelli 2016; Godfrey et al. 2020). Yet, several works have emphasized that the role
played by banks in allocating capital and fostering economic growth should encourage more research (Beck,
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2010; Levine 2005), beyond financial performance. Despite a growing body of evi-
dence points to the positive impact of sustainable practices on banking profitability (Wu and Shen 2013; Cornett,
Erhemjamts, and Tehranian 2016; Gangi et al. 2019; Nizam et al. 2019; among others), whether and how ESG
activities affect bank risk remains a fundamental and open question.
To the best of our knowledge, there are no published studies on this topic in a broader ESG context and with
a focus on bank stability or risk-taking. Existing papers examine only one ESG aspect: for example, Anginer
et al. (2018) find that a subset of corporate governance (shareholder friendliness) leads to higher stand-alone
and systemic risks, especially for larger banks or with stronger safety nets, while Gangi et al. (2019) argue that
more environmentally engaged banks exhibit less risk. Given this gap in the literature and the importance of
the issue, a key contribution of this paper is hence to link bank stability and all ESG dimensions by searching
for robust evidence of a risk reduction channel, in the specific context of financial crises. Moreover, we aim at
providing findings that are robust from issues of reverse causality and endogeneity, that frequently affect the
analysis of CSR effects on risk and performance (Bénabou and Tirole 2010).
The theoretical literature on the link between CSR and risk provides two main views. The ‘risk mitigation
view’, within the stakeholder theory, posits that greater investments in CSR act as insurance for firms that create
moral capital or goodwill among stakeholders (Godfrey 2005; Godfrey, Merrill, and Hansen 2009; El Ghoul and
Karoui 2017). This may prove to be a considerable advantage during periods of financial turmoil and economic
decline. Instead, the ‘overinvestment view’ considers CSR investments as a waste of resources and implies a
positive association with firm risk derived from managerial entrenchment. Managers may seek to overinvest in
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CSR for their private benefit or personal reputation (Barnea and Rubin 2010), or to gain support from activists
(Cespa and Cestone 2007). Closely connected with the risk mitigation view, one should also consider the risk
implications of the relationship between social performance and expected returns (Bouslah, Kryzanowski, and
M’Zali 2018), through the effects of idiosyncratic risk in asset pricing (Boutin-Dufresne and Savaria 2004; Lee
and Faff 2009), hence predicting a negative relationship between CSR and risk.5
If CSR is associated with a perceived lower risk from market participants, this should also lower the cost of
capital, reduce agency and asymmetric information issues (El Ghoul et al. 2011) and reduce capital constraints
hence leading to better access to finance (Cheng, Ioannou, and Serafeim 2014). Additionally, CSR has also been
found to enhance bank earnings quality (García-Sánchez and García-Meca 2017). In the non–financial sector,
CSR activities seem to reduce losses in market shares for high levels of leverage (Bae et al. 2018), to be nega-
tively correlated with stock price crash risks (Kim, Li, and Li 2014) and to improve credit ratings (Attig et al.
2013): similar effectsmay be present also in the banking industry. Finally, sustainabilitymay be used strategically
by managers as a risk mitigating tool towards adverse consequences of negative events (Godfrey, Merrill, and
Hansen 2009; Attig et al. 2013; McCarthy, Oliver, and Song 2017). Consistently, recent evidence underlines an
insurance-like role of sustainable practices during the global financial crisis (Lins, Servaes, and Tamayo 2017),
especially against idiosyncratic risk (Godfrey, Merrill, and Hansen 2009).
We hypothesize that higher ESG scores may be associated with more prudent and sustainable banking activ-
ities, reducing the overall risk. Moreover, this effect should be stronger when negative events occur, especially
during crisis years: benefits for companies from CSR engagement strongly emerge when unexpected declines
in trust occur. Consistently with recent findings on non-financial enterprises (Lins, Servaes, and Tamayo 2017),
we conjecture a positive role played by ESG scores in enhancing market trust and stability for banks during
financial turmoil. Our prediction is based on themoral capital theory, which sees CSR as an insurance-like strat-
egy for shareholders value maximization, by mitigating stakeholders’ conflict in the event of a crisis (Bouslah,
Kryzanowski, and M’Zali 2018).
H1. Banks with higher ESG scores are less risky, especially during a financial crisis.
Most studies focus on proxies related to one ESG dimension (Berger, Imbierowicz, and Rauch 2016; Anginer
et al. 2018; Gangi et al. 2019). We differentiate our study from previous research by examining the ESG–bank
risk linkage disaggregating all its components. Due to the heterogeneity of CSR activities, reflected also in ESG
measurement methodologies (Liang and Renneboog 2017),6 there are significant interconnections across its
components (Galbreath 2013). Nonetheless, the existing literature has suggested that each pillar of ESG should
play a significant role on banks’ stability.
In general, one could anticipate a weak link between the Environmental pillar and banks, in contrast with
non–financial firms. Evidence from the latter shows that environmentally pro–active corporations experience
a reduction in perceived riskiness from investors (Feldman, Soyka, and Ameer 1997) and that environmen-
tally–friendly activities are associatedwith better stakeholder engagement (Cheng, Ioannou, and Serafeim 2014).
Bouslah, Kryzanowski, and M’Zali (2013) argue that on one side this effect arises from reduced compliance
costs for environmental regulations (less likely to impact banks), but also from improved image and loyalty of
key stakeholders (potentially holding also in the banking sector). Gangi et al. (2019) document a robust neg-
ative association between environmental friendliness of banks and their risk. The authors argue that there are
direct and indirect effects at work derived fromdifferent channels on the costs or stability of funding: the lending
channel, operational efficiency, reputation, and loyalty of customers. Furthermore, environmental performances
directly link to stakeholder confidence by strengthening themoral dimension of firms, and thus enhanced repu-
tation (Godfrey 2005). Therefore, in linewith themoral capital theory, we explore environmental banks practices
role in restoring trust during exogenous confidence downturns, such as financial crises.
H2. Environmental activism reduces bank risk-taking, especially during a financial crisis.
With reference to the Social component, we expect that more attention on the improvement of human rights
and employee relations and generally promoting workforce conditions and morale, could encourage a better
culture and more effective screening and monitoring of loans, ultimately reducing banks’ overall risks. How-
ever, this risk-mitigating effect may not be as explicit as financial derivatives in shielding banks from market
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shocks (Buston 2016). A positive link between workforce-related social aspects and stability is advanced by
several scholars (see Bauer, Derwall, andOtten 2007 in terms of commitment, loyalty and cost of litigation; Kane,
Argote, and Levine 2005 on cooperation and trust). Bouslah, Kryzanowski, and M’Zali (2018), argue that firms
with higher social performance have also higher moral capital, turning into a higher valuation of performance
from stakeholders. Additionally, most interactions with stakeholders occur through incomplete contracts, that
an exogenous shock may jeopardize. Therefore, high social capital during a crisis could mitigate this concern
(Lins, Servaes, and Tamayo 2017), leading to superior bank stability. For our purposes, high social engagement
enhances bank stability by strengthening stakeholder trust and market participants confidence.
H3. Bank instability is inversely related to the level of social engagement, especially during a financial crisis.
Concerning Governance, the link with stability is generally consistent with regulation and supervision
(Dell’Atti et al. 2017). Several banking crises have been associated, at least partially, with poor governance or
conduct of management (Dowling 2006). However, this link is not always confirmed empirically (Stulz 2016).
The extensive literature survey on the relationship between governance and bank risk-taking provided by Berger,
Imbierowicz, and Rauch (2016) and Anginer et al. (2018) shows how relevant and complex is this relationship.
The latter document how a shareholder-friendly governance increases both stand-alone and systemic risks in
banks, and this behaviour is different than in non–financial firms due to the presence of explicit and implicit
safety nets. Similarly, a greater shareholder orientation seems to be associated with greater losses during the cri-
sis (Beltratti and Stulz 2012; Leung, Song, and Chen 2019). Mollah and Liljeblom (2016) find that banks with
more powerful CEOs performed better and reduced their asset risk during the sovereign debt crisis than during
the credit crisis, despite accepting higher insolvency risk. Their results also suggest that board independence is
associated with greater bank solvency.
According to the stakeholder view, the governance pillar should be positively associated with bank stability
due to the lower incentive to pass–through risks (Kirkpatrick 2009). Stakeholder-oriented corporate governance
may be pivotal in strengthening social purposes and boosting bank moral capital. In this paper, we explore the
relevance of stakeholder-oriented corporate governance in enhancing bank resilience, during a period of lack
of trust, such as the global financial crisis. However, the relationship between governance and bank stability is
particularly complex to disentangle. Gaganis et al. (2020) explore in detail this issue for a large cross-country
sample, concluding that the positive impact of corporate governance on bank stability emerges when macro-
prudential policies increase. The role of these policies appears particularly strong in reducing the likelihood and
severity of financial crises.
H4. Fair governance practices positively affect bank stability, especially during a financial crisis.
As discussed in the introduction, CSR engagement does not fall outside the scope of regulation: particularly
in recent years regulators have been pushing for more controls and action on sustainable finance and bank-
ing. In 2014 the EU adopted the Non-Financial Reporting Directive (NFRD), that emphasized the importance
of disclosure requirements for firms to include environmental and other non-financial performance; in 2018
the European Commission published an action plan that sets out an EU strategy on sustainable finance and a
roadmap for future work across the financial system (EC 2018). In 2021, the EC also adopted a broad set of
measures aimed at fostering the funding of sustainable activities and achieve climate neutrality by 2050 (EC
2011).
Literature on the consequences of such norms on banks is scant. Chen et al. (2018) investigate firms’ reaction
to China’s 2008 requirement to disclose CSR activities, documenting an increasing of firm sustainable engage-
ment at the expense of performances. Grewal, Riedl, and Serafeim (2019), by examining the equity market
reaction to passage of the EU 2014 NFRD, show a negative association for EU firms. The documented reac-
tion appears to be less negative for firms with higher pre-directive non-financial performance and non-financial
disclosure levels.
In a recent study, Jackson et al. (2020) find that the effect of mandatory social responsibility behaviour led to
a significant increase in the CSR engagement in firms operating in 24 OECD countries, although this did not
translate in lower corporate irresponsibility. Similarly, a pilot study by Fiechter, Hitz, and Lehman (2020) provide
evidence that EU firms increased their CSR activities immediately after the adoption of the 2014 EUNFRD, thus
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confirming that, at least in Europe, regulation was the right institutional answer to stakeholders’ recent call for
more corporate socially responsible behaviour. Specifically, the EU Parliament, adopted a mandatory ‘comply
or explain’ approach which obliges firms to identify and justify any areas of non-compliance.
In this paper, we rely on the structural importance of the 2014 EU NFRD and aim at testing whether more
ESG engaged banks were affected differently by the directive compared to others.We expect therefore to find two
possible consequences; (i) an increase in compliance costs for banks, which negatively affect their performance
(Chen et al. 2018); (ii) a rewarding effect for banks more engaged in ESG practices, which is reflected by a
positive impact on their performance (Bouslah, Kryzanowski, and M’Zali 2018), consistently with the moral
capital theory framework.
H5: The EU 2014 Non-Financial Reporting Directive (NFRD) rewarded banks more engaged in CSR practices.
3. Methodology and data
3.1. Empirical strategy
Ourmethodology consists of two steps. In the first step, we empirically investigate the relationship between CSR
engagement (proxied by ESG scores) and bank stability in a setting that is robust to potential endogeneity issues.
We follow Wintoki, Linck, and Netter (2012) using the improved system version of the generalized method
of moments (GMM) estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) and built on the work of Arellano and
Bover (1995). Moreover, to better control for the issue of reverse causality, we run the instrumental variables
(IV) two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression estimator (see Section 5).
Banks with better financial performance could be simultaneously more stable and more inclined to invest in
CSR strategies (Bénabou and Tirole 2010; Chih, Chih, and Chen 2010). The consistency of the system GMM
model depends on the assumption that the error term is not autocorrelated and on the validity of the instruments
used. Two specification tests are reported. The first is the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions, which
examines the validity of the instruments by analysing the sample analogue of the moment conditions used in
the estimation procedure. The second test examines the hypothesis of no autocorrelation in the error term.
The presence of first-order autocorrelation in the differenced residuals does not imply that the estimates are
inconsistent; however, the presence of second-order autocorrelation does.
We employ the two-step system GMM estimator (or linear dynamic panel data) with Windmeijer corrected
standard errors.7 Lagged non-binary explanatory variables are used to address endogeneity. Second and higher-
order lags and differences of the dependent variable are used as instruments to avoid the endogeneity concern
occurring from the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable. In all specifications the number of instru-
ments employed is smaller than the group under investigation (Roodman 2009). The lagged dependent variable
is treated as endogenous while all the remaining explanatory variables are exogenous. We use the following
equation for the model:







β5CountryControlsi,t−1 + vi + μit (1)
where the one-year Merton’s Distance to Default (DTD) is the stability measure of bank i at time t (the year
in progress), that we employ as a market-based measure following Hassan, Khan, and Paltrinieri (2019) and
Anginer et al. (2018).
We collect probability of default (PD) data fromBloomberg andwe estimateDistance toDefault as the inverse
standard normal cumulative distribution function of the PD (Jessen and Lando 2015). The higher are DTD val-
ues, the lower is the risk of bank default.8 Tomitigate the effects of outliers, the dependent variable is winsorized
at the 1% of each tail.
In line with previous research (Galbreath 2013; Kim, Li, and Li 2014; Crifo, Forget, and Teyssie 2015; Sassen,
Hinze, and Hardeck 2016; among others), we proxy the CSR engagement (our target variable) through ESG
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scores. We have different variables of interest (see Section 3.3), because we also disaggregate ESG scores om pil-
lars and constituents (e.g. emissions, environmental product innovation, human rights, shareholders, etc.). Each
target variable is interacted with the crisis years dummy (D_CRISIS), that equals 1 during the global financial
and European sovereign debt crises periods (2008–2012) and 0 otherwise (2005–2007 and 2013–2017).9 This
econometric approach allows us to verify whether ESG scores’ effect on bank stability depends on economic
cycles (Lins, Servaes, and Tamayo 2017).10
Moreover, consistently with studies examining the relationship between CSR and firm risk (Bouslah,
Kryzanowski, andM’Zali 2013; Sassen, Hinze, andHardeck 2016; Gupta andKrishnamurti 2018), we control for
additional variables thatmay affect bank stability, both bank-specific (namely size, capitalization, credit risk, effi-
ciency, profitability, liquidity, income diversification, ECB’s unconventional liquidity injections proxied by the
Very Long–TermRefinancingOperations, VLTROs11), and country-specific (industry concentration, economic
growth, strength of capital regulation and supervision).
Table 1 defines our variables, data sources and expected signs. To mitigate the effect of outliers, accounting-
based control variables (SIZE, ETA, LLR_GL, CIR, ROAE, CASH_TA, and DIV) are winsorized at the 1% level
on both tails.
Standard errors are clustered at the bank-level. Finally, c is a constant term, the variable vi is the unobserved
bank-specific-effect and μit is the idiosyncratic error.
The second step involves exploiting the effects of the Non-Financial Reporting Directive (NFRD), issued
in late 2014 (Directive 2014/95/EU), in a differences-in-differences (DID) setting. All banks in our sample are
listed, withmore than 500 employees, so theywere affected by theNFRD, yet they differ in their CSR engagement
at the time of enforcing the directive.
More specifically, the NFRD requires certain large public-interest entities to disclose their performance on a
range of non-financial dimensions alongside their accounts, on a ‘comply or explain’ basis. These dimensions,
despite being labelled differently (‘respect for human rights’ or ‘diversity on board of directors’), are all within
the scope of ESG scores. Therefore, having only firms within the scope of the directive in our sample (EU-based
large listed banks that are those for which consistent ESG scores are available), allows us to further analyse the
relationship between ESG and bank stability by comparing their performance before and after 2014, and in
particular focus on the behaviour of entities that already achieved higher ESG scores before the Directive.
This represents the ideal setting to investigate our fifth hypothesis (H5), both an ordinary least square (OLS)
and a panel data with and without fixed-effects models, over the period 2012–2017:







β5CountryControlsi,t−1 + vi + μit (2)
where the dummy D_SHOCK representing the introduction of the NFRD that takes value 1 for post-treatment
years (2015–2017) and 0 otherwise. The dummy D_TREATED takes value of 1 for banks above average values
of ESG scores in the year of the shock (2014) and 0 otherwise, and D_SHOCK∗D_TREATED represents their
interaction. Therefore, the coefficient of D_SHOCK∗D_TREATED is our target variable. We further control for
a set of bank and country characteristic, as well for the same fixed effects employed in our baseline model (see
Equation (1)).
To address the potential bias arising from treated and control groups heterogeneity (banks above or below
average values of ESG scores), we employ a propensity scorematching (PSM) procedure (Rosenbaum and Rubin
1983). This procedure requires the following steps. To identify the control group, we first run a logitmodel to cal-
culate propensity scores of being a high-ESG bank, employing all non-binary bank-level control variables (SIZE,
ETA, LLR_GL, CIR, ROAE, CASH_TA, and DIV) and including bank fixed-effects (Bhandari and Javakhadze
2017) for the period before the introduction of the Directive (2012–2014).We thenmatch, without replacement,
each treated bank to a control bank using the Nearest Neighbour matching (see e.g. Chang et al. 2019). Finally,
we run the DID regression on the resulting matched sample and carry out a battery of robustness checks, as
detailed in Section 5.
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Table 1. Variable definitions and expected relationships vs bank stability.
Variable name Definition Source Expected sign
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
DTD The Merton’s Distance to Default, computed as the inverse standard






ESG Environmental Social Governance (ESG) score is an overall company
score based on the self-reported information in the Environmental
(ENV), Social (SOC) and corporate Governance (GOV) pillars. See





ENV Environmental score is an overall company score based on the
weighted average of self-reported information in the Resource
Use score, Emissions score and Environmental Innovation score. See





SOC Social score is an overall company score based on the weighted
average of self-reported information in theWorkforce score, Human
rights score, Community score and Product Responsibility score. See
Table A.1 in Appendix for further details.
Positive
GOV Governance score is an overall company score based on the weighted
average of self-reported information in the Management score,
Shareholders score, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Strategy
score. See Table A.1 in Appendix for further details.
Positive
D_SHOCK Dummy for the publication of the Non-financial Reporting Directive
2014/95/EU: equals 1 for years 2015–2017 and 0 otherwise.
Authors’ calculation Negative
D_TREATED Dummy equal to 1 for banks above mean ESG values in the year of the
shock (2014) and 0 otherwise.
Authors’ calculation Negative
BANK CONTROLS
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets. Thomson Reuters database
(Authors’ calculation)
Positive/Negative
ETA Equity to total assets. Positive
LLR_GL Loan loss reserves to gross loans. Negative
CIR Cost-income ratio. Negative
ROAE Return on average Equity. Positive
CASH_TA Cash to total assets Positive
DIV Non-interest income to net operating revenue. Positive/Negative
D_VLTRO Dummy equals to 1 for the period in which the European Central
Bank (ECB) provided liquidity to a specific bank through the Very
Long-Term Refinancing Operations (VLTRO) and 0 otherwise.
Bloomberg database Positive/Negative
COUNTRY CONTROLS
GDP_GRW Annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate. World Bank Financial
Development database
Positive
HHI The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index calculated as the sum of the squared





CAP_REG The strength of capital regulation at the country level. World Bank (Barth, Caprio,
and Levine 2008)
Positive
SUP_PWR The strength of supervision at the country level. Positive
D_CRISIS Dummy equals to 1 for years 2008–2012 and 0 otherwise (2005–2007
and 2013–2017).
Authors’ calculation Negative
Notes: This table describes the variables used in our model and summarizes their hypothesized relationships with our dependent variables (bank
stability).
3.2. Sample description
The analysis focuses on banks headquartered in European countries, with data available fromThomson Reuters’
Refinitiv on ESG scores (our variable of interest), both at composite and individual levels during the period
2005–2017 (the last data available).12 These scores are designed to transparently and objectively measure a
company’s relative ESG performance, commitment and effectiveness across 10 main themes (emissions, envi-
ronmental product innovation, human rights, shareholders, etc.) based on company–reported information (e.g.
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annual reports, non-governmental organizationswebsites, andmedia outlets). The database provides ESG scores
data on approximately 1,000 companies (mainly U.S. and European) as of 2002.
These criteria significantly restrict our sample, despite the Heckman two-step model confirms the absence
of sample selection bias (see Section 5). Firstly, non–financial disclosures became mandatory in 2014 and only
for large firms (Directive 2014/95/EU). Additionally, firms can decide not to report ESG scores to Thomson
Reuters’ Refinitiv database.13 Finally, since Thomson Reuters does not specify the reason for missing values on
ESG scores, it would be biased to compare banks that do not disclose this information with those that do.
The final sample consists of 84 banks that cover 21 European countries belonging to Eastern (5),Western (6),
Northern (6) and Southern (4) Europe (Table A3). All banks are listed. In addition, half of our sample banks are
included in the EBA’s stress tests for large banks. We concentrate on Europe for the following reasons. Firstly,
ESG is particularly relevant in this area: according to the literature, European companies lead if compared to
others (Ho, Wang, and Vitell 2012). Secondly, the European Union passed the Directive 2014/95/EU fostering
the role of non-financial information disclosure of firms. Finally, there is limited research linking ESG to risk
within the EU.
The data collected are year-end observations over a relatively long period (2005–2017) that includes the global
financial and European sovereign debt crises. By means of an interaction term, we investigate whether the effect
on stability depends on economic and/or financial conditions. Data is available only yearly: we are therefore
unable to conduct the analysis with higher frequency.
3.3. Measurement of ESG variables
ESG terminology first appeared in the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) and then
in several companies’ CSR reports (Davis and Stephenson 2006). Although there is no univocal identification
of this concept yet, ESG scores have already been extensively used by consulting firms, financial advisors, and
asset managers. Bassen and Kovacs (2008) argue that ESG scores monitoring and disclosures play a key role in
developing CSR strategies and allow investors to assess firms’ risks and opportunities. Therefore, ESG scores are
currently the leading proxies of CSR engagement (Liang and Renneboog 2017).
The granularity of information provided by Thomson Reuters’ Refinitiv database allows us to extend the
analysis beyond the overall composite score, including its three pillars as well as their individual components.
Table A1 in the Appendix summarizes the taxonomy of ESG scores, their definition, calculation, and weights
used for computation accordingly to Thomson Reuters’ methodology. All ESG scores range between 0 and 1,
with higher values indicating stronger performance in sustainability practices.
To verifyH1, on the joint effects of Environmental, Social, andGovernance scores on bank stability, we use the
ESG composite score (ESG). It captures a balanced view of the banks’ performance in the three areas (ENV, SOC,
and GOV) through an explicit weighted combination of a series of firm-specific indicators that proxy results
towards sustainability practices. We hypothesize a positive relationship with our dependent variable (DTD):
higher total ESG scores are expected to be linked with more prudent banking activities (especially due to a
long-term perspective and a stakeholder-based view) and decrease bank risk.
Since each ESG dimension bears its own identity (Oikonomou, Brooks, and Pavelin 2012; Bouslah,
Kryzanowski, and M’Zali 2013), our analysis is repeated by breaking down composite scores, firstly into its
three pillars and then into its sub-components (see the Appendix for further details), to avoid confounding the
effects of individual dimensions (Griffin and Mahon 1997; Johnson and Greening 1999).
The second target variable is the Environmental score (ENV), resulting from the weighted average of three
constituents: Resource Use; Emissions and Innovation. Based on our second hypothesis (H2), we expect a posi-
tive sign, because banks may be (or perceived) less risky if they integrate environmental issues in their lending
policies (Goss and Roberts 2011), by excluding borrowers more exposed to changes in environmental regula-
tion; could improve their operational efficiency (Fiordelisi, Marques-Ibanez, andMolyneux 2011; Clarkson et al.
2015; Gangi et al. 2019); through improvements in their reputation (Ruiz, García, and Revilla 2016; Aramburu
and Pescador 2017), or not being associated with controversial firms. We expect this relationship to hold also
when performing the baseline model on the three distinct components at the same time.
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To test for H3, we focus on the Social score (SOC), based on the following four indicators: Workforce;
Human rights; Community and Product Responsibility. We expect a positive sign on both the total SOC score
and its four constituents. This because lending and investing activities could provide greater stability, if loans
are granted, assets are selected and portfolios are monitored through strengthened processes (Allen, Carletti,
and Marquez 2011), including those pertaining to the Social dimension, especially the workforce and product
responsibility.
To verifyH4, we concentrate on the Governance score (GOV) and its three constituents:Management; Share-
holders and CSR Strategy. We again hypothesize a positive relationship with our dependent variable (Dowling
2006; Dell’Atti et al. 2017): improved corporate governance should represent a key tool in managing risks and
maintaining stability. In general, these positive relationships should strengthen during periods of distress, such
as the global financial and the European sovereign debt crises. For this reason, we interact each target variable
with a crisis–specific dummy variable.
3.4. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 reports the summary statistics and tests for differences inmeans between the crisis and non-crisis periods
for all variables, excluding the VLTROs dummy. As expected, during the crisis years the Distance to Default
significantly decreased, reaching the average value of 2.688 over the period 2008–2012 compared to 2.898 in the
normal years. The ESG score (ESG), as well as each of its pillars (ENV, SOC, andGOV) show a decline during the
crisis. The average mean of the composite score decreases (from 61.1% to 59%), mainly driven by the negative
change displayed by the GOV pillar (from 54.3% to 51%). We argue that during the crisis, banks could be more
focused on financial strength or profitability, rather than sustainability, consistently with Cornett, Erhemjamts,
and Tehranian (2016).
About bank-specific characteristics, CIR and ROAE are the variables showing the most significant changes
over the sample period, followed by SIZE and DIV. Operational efficiency worsened during the crisis years (due
to the decline in operating income): the CIR grew from 65% to 69.4% and, simultaneously, the ROAE decreased
from 8% to 4.5%. The variable SIZE grew moderately from 9.052 in the non-crisis period to 9.069 in the crisis
period: possibly this is the result of consolidation processes occurring as a by-product of bank rescues. At the
same time, the mean DIV decreased from 10.90% to 9.80%, indicating a lower capability of exploiting diverse
income sources during crisis years.
With reference to macroeconomic factors, only GDP growth (GDP_GRW) and the supervisory strength
(SUP_PWR) varied significantly. More specifically, GDP_GRW exhibited a considerable decline in crisis years
(0.20%) compared to the non-crisis period (2.40%), due to the expected hoarding effect of the contraction in
demand. Similarly, SUP_PWR decreased significantly (from 10.08 to 9.91), corroborating the European Com-
mission’s call for strengthening banking supervision after it showed a limited effectiveness in ensuring bank
stability.
The difference in means between the two sub-periods, reveals that, with only a few exceptions (namely size,
cash to total assets, strength of capital regulations and market concentration), all variables (including our target
ones) show a statistically significant difference during crisis years. Table A2 in Appendix shows that although
most pairwise correlation coefficients are statistically significant, the magnitudes are relatively low.
4. Main results
4.1. Baseline analysis
Table 3 reports the results of the baseline model described in Equation (1) for our sample banks over the period
2005–2017. This model is based on a two-step system GMM estimator and includes the Hansen test, Hansen p-
value (confirming the validity of the instruments) and AR(2) – second-order autocorrelation tests (confirming
that there is no second order serial correlation in the error terms). We use alternatively, as target variables, the
composite ESG score (column I) and its constituents (columns II, III, and IV).
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Table 2. Summary statistics.
Crisis period (I) Non-crisis periods (II)
Variables Mean (Std. Dev.) Min.–Max. Mean (Std. Dev.) Min.–Max. Difference in means (I)–(II)
Dependent variable
DTD 2.688 0.940–4.689 2.898 0.801–3.897 −0.209∗∗∗
(0.535) (0.488)
Target variables
ESG 0.590 0.166–0.913 0.611 0.159–0.931 −0.021∗∗
(0.194) (0.187)
ENV 0.651 0.138–0.966 0.668 0.098–0.973 −0.017∗∗
(0.255) (0.241)
SOC 0.594 0.082–0.980 0.614 0.077–0.971 −0.019∗∗
(0.222) (0.210)
GOV 0.516 0.084–0.952 0.543 0.044–0.916 −0.026∗∗
(0.220) (0.211)
Control variables
SIZE 9.069 3.263–14.763 9.052 2.688–14.733 0.017
(2.428) (2.370)
ETA 0.093 0.018–0.449 0.100 0.018–0.449 −0.007∗∗
(0.065) (0.059)
LLR_GL 0.038 0–0.261 0.046 0–0.317 −0.008∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.060)
CIR 0.694 0.273–1.619 0.650 0.273–1.619 0.044∗∗∗
(0.236) (0.188)
ROAE 0.045 −0.690–0.520 0.080 −0.689–0.495 −0.035∗∗∗
(0.147) (0.125)
CASH_TA 0.116 0–0.636 0.121 0–0.636 −0.005
(0.115) (0.114)
DIV 0.098 −0.058–0.802 0.109 −0.058–0.802 −0.011∗
(0.159) (0.154)
GDP_GRW 0.002 −0.151–0.083 0.024 −0.098–0.255 −0.022∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.023)
HHI 0.336 0–1.000 0.329 0–1.000 0.007
(0.232) (0.207)
CAP_REG 6.479 3–9 6.493 3–9 −0.014
(1.872) (1.697)
SUP_PWR 9.911 5–14.5 10.08 5–14.5 −0.169∗∗
(2.110) (2.093)
Notes: This table reports the summary statistics (mean, standard deviation, minimum andmaximum values) of our variables in (I)
crisis years (2008–2012) and (II) non-crisis periods (2005–2007 and 2013–2017). Variable definitions are provided in Table 1. All
control variables based on accounting data (SIZE, ETA, LLR_GL, CIR, ROAE, CASH_TA, DIV) are winsorized at the 1% of each tail.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels for test of differences in means between crisis-period (I)
and Non-crisis periods (II).
Each variable of interest (ESG, ENV, SOC, and GOV) is interacted with the dummy crisis (D_CRISIS) to
verify whether the contribution of ESG strategies to bank stability varies over time. We also include control
variables related to bank–specific and country–specific factors.
Focusing on the results for the total ESG score, column (I) of Table 3 displays a significant relationship with
our dependent variable (Distance to Default), but only when interacted with the dummy crisis and showing
the expected positive sign. In other words, we find that the overall engagement in sustainability practices has
explanatory power for stabilization during periods of financial distress, as hypothesized (H1) and consistently
with the moral capital theory. This implies that banks with higher ESG scores seem less prone to insolvency
during periods of financial distress. In line with Peloza (2006), engaging in sustainability practices encourages
more prudent banking, fosters more stable relations with the financial community and enhances reputation.
Our results confirm the ‘risk mitigation view’, deriving from the stakeholder theory, seeing CSR as an
insurance-like mechanism towards stakeholders (Godfrey 2005; Godfrey, Merrill, and Hansen 2009; El Ghoul
and Karoui 2017). The same holds true when we look at the individual constituents of ESG scores (columns II,
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III, and IV of Table 3): only in times of crisis, each ESG pillar (ENV, SOC, and GOV) is explanatory over bank
stability, supporting our hypothesis (H2, H3, and H4).
With reference to the ENV–stability linkage, Table 3 shows that environmentally-active banks benefit in
terms of stability during crisis periods (Ducassy 2013). This outcome is broadly in line with previous studies
(e.g. Feldman, Soyka, and Ameer 1997; Bouslah, Kryzanowski, and M’Zali 2013; Cheng, Ioannou, and Ser-
afeim 2014; Gangi et al. 2019). For example, Feldman, Soyka, and Ameer (1997) found that engagement in
environmental practices implies a reduction in perceived riskiness from investors. Cheng, Ioannou, and Ser-
afeim (2014)‘s results suggest that environmentally–friendly activities are associated with better stakeholder
Table 3. Baseline model.
DTD
ESG score ESG score components
Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV)
DTD (−1) 0.669∗∗∗ 0.669∗∗∗ 0.662∗∗∗ 0.673∗∗∗

















D_CRISIS −0.250∗∗∗ −0.226∗∗∗ −0.275∗∗∗ −0.263∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.081) (0.067) (0.072)
SIZE (−1) −0.006 −0.006 −0.004 −0.010
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009)
ETA (−1) 2.989∗∗ 3.523∗∗ 2.480∗ 2.112∗
(1.392) (1.657) (1.385) (1.218)
LLR_GL (−1) −2.344∗∗ −2.454∗∗ −2.323∗∗ −1.926∗
(1.070) (1.142) (1.037) (1.036)
CIR (−1) 0.057 0.079 0.038 0.022
(0.178) (0.168) (0.179) (0.176)
ROAE (−1) −0.176 −0.206 −0.188 −0.193
(0.256) (0.241) (0.250) (0.254)
CASH_TA (−1) 0.461 0.392 0.620∗ 0.648
(0.534) (0.534) (0.351) (0.546)
DIV (−1) −0.216∗ −0.220 −0.211∗ −0.253∗∗
(0.117) (0.139) (0.113) (0.104)
D_VLTRO −0.014 −0.016 −0.013 −0.007
(0.058) (0.059) (0.056) (0.067)
GDP_GRW (−1) −0.941 −1.046 −0.743 −0.996
(0.842) (1.246) (0.799) (1.194)
HHI (−1) 0.047 0.034 0.014 0.054
(0.101) (0.105) (0.095) (0.089)
CAP_REG (−1) 0.010 0.012 0.013 0.008
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011)
SUP_PWR (−1) −0.021∗ −0.019∗∗ −0.021∗ −0.020∗∗
(0.012) (0.007) (0.011) (0.010)
(continued)
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Table 3. Continued.
DTD
ESG score ESG score components
Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV)
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster SE Bank Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. of obs. 439 439 439 439
Hansen p-value 0.894 0.893 0.896 0.896
AR(2) 0.394 0.422 0.367 0.430
Notes: This table reports the estimates of the two-step system GMM model
during the period 2005–2017. The dependent variable is the one-year Mer-
ton’s Distance to Default (DTD) whichmeasures bank stability. The variables
of interest are: the ESG score – seemodel (I); and its three components (ENV,
SOC and GOV score) – see models (II), (III), and (IV), respectively. Each target
variable is interacted with the dummy crisis (D_CRISIS). Variable definitions
are provided in Table 1. All non-binary independent variables are lagged
by one year with respect to the dependent variable. The control variables
based on accounting data (SIZE, ETA, LLR_GL, CIR, ROAE, CASH_TA, DIV) are
winsorized at the 1% of each tail. The Hansen p-value is that of the Hansen
test statistic of over-identifying restrictions, while AR(2) are the p-value of
the first and second-order autocorrelation test statistic. Bank fixed-effects
(FE) are included in all specifications. Bank clustered standard errors (SE) are
reported in parentheses. The superscripts∗∗∗,∗∗, and∗denote coefficients
statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively,
in two-tailed tests.
engagement. Gangi et al. (2019) show that banks should assume environmental responsibility not only to gen-
erate spillover benefits to the community, but also to achieve their own strategic goals and address the pressures
of strengthening regulatory requirements. We find that SOC positively affects bank stability only during crisis
year. A possible explanation for this result is that more active lending and monitoring activities due to increased
employee satisfaction should strengthen stability.
Finally, a significant and positive sign is found also for GOV, but again only during times of crisis. Previous
studies find more shareholder-oriented banks incurred greater losses (Anginer et al. 2018) especially during the
crisis (Beltratti and Stulz 2012). However, unlike Anginer et al. (2018), our evidence suggests that improved
corporate governance seems to provide benefits in terms of stability. Our results are therefore in line with litera-
ture exploring the link between stakeholder-oriented governance and bank stability (Dell’Atti et al. 2017; Leung,
Song, and Chen 2019).
Overall, our findings on ESG target variables show that, during periods of financial distress, the integration
of ESG practices into banks’ internal processes seems to be beneficial in reducing bank fragility.
However, bank stability is also related to other bank- or country-specific factors. Table 3 shows that the prox-
ies for bank capital (ETA), asset quality (LLR_GL), income diversification (DIV) and ECB’s unconventional
liquidity injections (D_VLTRO) are relevant.
As expected, the ETA and LLR_GL variables show a positive and a negative sign, respectively. Overall, we
find that banks that are more capitalized and with a sound asset quality tend to be more stable. For DIV and
D_VLTRO, the negative sign prevails, suggesting that increasing diversification reduces bank stability. Indeed,
diversification is not always beneficial for banks, for instance when it extends to businesses or geographical areas
poorly understood bymanagers or when activities, despite diverse, remain highly correlated.Moreover, the neg-
ative sign for D_VLTROmeans that the ECB unconventional liquidity injections seem to have contributed to a
lower stability for banks that obtained them. This result confirms those of Tabak, Fazio, andCajueiro (2012), who
find that banks withmore liquidity appear farther from the stability frontier. Such evidence is intuitively reason-
able since high levels of liquidity may encourage banks to put in place risk-taking behaviour that can determine
a decrease in their resilience (although the contrary may be also true, see e.g. Bias, Heider, and Hoerova 2016).
With reference to macroeconomic factors, Table 3 reveals statistically significant coefficients only for the
variable targeting supervisory powers (SUP_PWR) at the country level, but the sign is not as expected (negative
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rather than positive), implying a decrease in bank stability. We therefore find that the strength of supervision is
limited in ensuring bank stability. Although this result confirms recent findings in the literature (Chiaramonte,
Poli, and Oriani 2015), it should be interpreted with caution. In other words, instead of signalling that more
supervisory power lowers stability, the variable ismore likely supportive of the recent European effort in fostering
improvements in supervision, especially after 2011 and above all through the creation of a banking union.
Finally, as expected, we find a significant negative sign for the crisis dummy (D_CRISIS). However, this result
should be read jointly with the interaction term. Considered alone, the financial crisis dummy suggests that
financial turmoil leads to a generalized reduction in the distance-to-default (i.e. worsening stability). But ESG
scores (including individual pillars), during the same years (i.e. the interaction term) invert this trend through
an increase in the distance-to-default. The magnitude of the latter effect is stronger than the former (for the
overall ESG score and the Social and Governance pillars), or slightly smaller (for the Environmental pillar).
4.2. Tests for disentangled ESG components
We re-estimate our baseline model using, as target variables, the following ESG components: Resource Use score,
Emission score, and Environmental Innovation score for the first pillar ENV;Workforce score,Human Rights score,
Community score, and Product Responsibility score for the second pillar SOC; and finally, Management score,
Shareholders score, andCSRStrategy score for the pillarGOV(seeTableA1 inAppendix).Due tomulticollinearity
issues across sub-components of the same ESG pillar, we centred themwith their averages. Results are presented
in Table 4.
We find that the ESG–bank stability linkage is mainly driven by the following four sub-components: Envi-
ronmental Innovation score, Workforce score, Product Responsibility score, and Shareholders score. These are
significant only when interacted with the dummy crisis, showing a positive relationship with our proxies for
bank stability. One possible empirical channel could be through lending if banks with higher ESG scores are
those that account more for environmental and social components in their loan origination and pricing policies
(see e.g. Chen et al. 2020; Zhou et al. 2021). It is reasonable to expect that on average such banks will benefit in
terms of more stability (i.e. less risk) in a credit-driven financial crisis.
We find that the beneficial effects of sustainability practices on bank stability, occur only during periods of
financial distress, and is attributable to a variety of factors. These include: the development of new environmental
technologies and processes that optimize the use of resources; the fair treatment of the workforce; the banks’
responsibility to produce quality goods and services integrating the customer’s health, safety, integrity, and data
privacy; the banks’ ability to guarantee equal treatment of shareholders and to enforce anti-takeover devices. All
these findings reinforce the expectations included in our hypothesis (H2, H3 and H4), adding more insights to
the categories of ESG scores that appear more strongly associated to financial stability of banks during financial
crisis.
4.3. Effects of the 2014 EU non-financial reporting directive
We also examine the impact of the EU NFRD of 2014 for banks with higher or lower ESG scores, in a DID
regressionmodel. Our sample includes European countries (Norway, Russia, Switzerland) outside the geograph-
ical scope of the NFRD. Additionally, some countries (Denmark, France) implemented comparable regulations
before 2014. Therefore, we performed the DID setting excluding Russia, Switzerland, France, Norway, and Den-
mark.Other countries (i.e. Greece, Finland, Luxembourg, and Sweden) implementedmore restrictive thresholds
based on the number of employees, total assets and/or net turnover, however, they all applied the NFRD to
listed companies. Since our sample is entirely constituted by listed banks, with more than 500 employees the
comparability of results is ensured.
Panel A of Table 5 shows the result of the logit model employed to calculate propensity scores through non-
binary bank-level controls and bank fixed-effects. Panel B confirms that there are no significant differences
between targets and their matches in our sample. In other words, our methodological approach allows us to
conduct our DID comparison on control banks that are very similar to treatment banks, reducing individual
THE EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF FINANCE 15
differences and the related potential bias. Finally, Panel C shows the results of the DID, confirming the robust-
ness of our baseline results. More specifically, they confirm that the stabilizing effect of ESG scores is present for
banks with higher levels of ESG ratings after the reform of 2014, consistently with ourH5.
The results of the DID model support the recent increasing effort of European regulators towards a manda-
tory enhanced disclosure of non-financial information. More specifically, we interpret the results of the DID
regression considering the moral capital theory (Bouslah, Kryzanowski, and M’Zali 2018). It is reasonable to
assume that since the introduction of the NFRD, banks’ stakeholders and shareholders have recognized the
higher moral capital accumulated by high-ESG banks, which by creating relational wealth among stakeholders,
reduce uncertainty on future cash flows and improve market-based stability measures.
Table 4. Estimation results for disentangled ESG score components.
DTD
ENV SOC GOV
Variables (I) (II) (III)
DTD (−1) 0.720∗∗∗ 0.680∗∗∗ 0.663∗∗∗
(0.140) (0.126) (0.107)
Resource use score (−1) 0.283
(0.337)
Resource use score (−1)∗D_CRISIS −0.537
(1.431)
Emissions score (−1) 0.088
(0.187)
Emissions score (−1)∗D_CRISIS −0.563
(0.583)
Environmental Innovation score (−1) −0.119
(0.144)
Environmental Innovation score (−1)∗D_CRISIS 0.294∗∗∗
(0.089)
Workforce score (−1) −0.154
(0.121)
Workforce score (−1)∗D_CRISIS 0.242∗∗
(0.109)
Human Rights score (−1) 0.137
(0.191)
Human Rights score (−1)∗D_CRISIS −0.481
(0.551)
Community score (−1) −0.009
(0.094)
Community score (−1)∗D_CRISIS −0.053
(0.232)
Product Responsibility score (−1) −0.089
(0.133)
Product Responsibility score (−1)∗D_CRISIS 0.372∗
(0.221)
Management score (−1) 0.058
(0.099)
Management score (−1)∗D_CRISIS −0.075
(0.201)
Shareholders score (−1) −0.041
(0.082)
Shareholders score (−1)∗D_CRISIS 0.220∗∗
(0.098)
CSR Strategy score (−1) 0.191
(0.181)
CSR Strategy score (−1)∗D_CRISIS −0.345
(0.327)
D_CRISIS −0.252∗∗∗ −0.243∗∗∗ −0.222∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.084) (0.068)
(continued)




Variables (I) (II) (III)
Control variables (−1) Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes
Cluster SE Bank Yes Yes Yes
N. of obs. 439 439 439
Hansen p-value 0.895 0.899 0.899
AR(2) 0.333 0.469 0.579
Notes: This table reports the estimates of the two-step system GMM
model obtained disentangling the ESG score components. Model
(I) is referred to the ENV component and includes the following
categories: Resource use score, Emissions score, and Environmental
Innovation score. Model (II) is referred to the SOC component and
includes the following categories: Workforce score, Human Rights
score, Community score, and Product Responsibility score. Model (III)
is referred to the GOV component and includes the following cat-
egories: Management score, Shareholders score, and CSR Strategy
score. Each target variable is interacted with the dummy crisis
(D_CRISIS). The dependent variable is the one-year Merton’s Dis-
tance to Default (DTD) which measures bank stability. All bank and
country controls are included. Variable definitions are provided in
Tables 1 and A.1 (in Appendix). The sample period observed is
2005–2017. All non-binary independent variables are lagged by
one year with respect to the dependent variable. The control vari-
ables based on accounting data (SIZE, ETA, LLR_GL, CIR, ROAE,
CASH_TA, DIV) are winsorized at the 1% of each tail. The Hansen
p-value is that of theHansen test statistic of over-identifying restric-
tions, while AR(2) are the p-value of the first and second-order
autocorrelation test statistic. Bank fixed-effects (FE) are included in
all specifications. Bank clustered standard errors (SE) are reported
in parentheses. The superscripts ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote coeffi-
cients statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively, in two-tailed tests.
Figure A1 in the Appendix shows that, in absence of the shock occurred in 2014, the trend for the bank
stabilitymeasure (DTD) is similar for both the treatment and the control groups, hence providing visual support
to the parallel trends assumption. The robustness of this finding is furtherly checked in the following section on
a relevant subsample of countries.
5. Additional analyses and robustness checks
To strengthen the validity of our findings, we run a set of further analyses and robustness checks. Firstly, account-
ing for the ESG score level as well as the duration of ESG disclosures, in Table 6 we test two-step system GMM
regressions using alternatively, as variables of interest, the ESG rating level (columns I) and the number of years
of the bank’s ESG disclosure (ESG_Nyears, columns II). For ESG rating levels we split our sample in two groups:
below or above the sample mean of the ESG score. Each target variable is interacted with the dummy crisis. This
approach allows us to test if previous results were prone to the non-random introduction of the legislative shock
(Directive 2014/95/EU). We confirm the stabilizing effect of ESG scores in periods financial distress for banks
with higher ESG scores, whereas for the subsample with lower ESG scores statistical significance is weak. In
addition, we find that, in times of financial turmoil, the longer the duration of ESG disclosures, the higher are
the benefits in terms of bank stability. Therefore, it seems that stability benefits from both a greater and a longer
engagement in ESG activities.
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To control for the sample selection bias originated by the criteria used to create our sample banks (see
Section 3.2), we also run the Heckman (1978)‘s two-stepmethod (Wu and Shen 2013; Shen et al. 2016; McGuin-
ness, Vieito, and Wang 2017) as follows. In the first step (Panel A of Table 7) we estimate the decision equation
using a multinomial probit model, whose parameters are used to calculate the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR), where
the dependent variables are dummies (D_ESG) equal to 1 from the year in which a bank of our sample started
to be involved in ESG practices and 0 before. The second step (see Panel B of Table 7) employs the IMR as the
additional explanatory variable in the performance equation, in our case the stability regression (Li and Prabhala
2007). Results stress the strength and unbiasedness of our baseline regression and confirm the significant and
positive role of our ESG target variables in supporting bank stability only during financial crisis.
Table 5. Effects of the 2014 EU non-financial reporting directive.



















N. of obs. 326
Panel B – Univariate statistics: effectiveness of matching
Difference
Variables Treated (T) Control (C) (T-C) P-value
SIZE 10.496 10.559 −0.063 0.590
ETA 0.098 0.098 0 0.900
LLR_GL 0.056 0.056 0 0.298
CIR 0.652 0.641 0.011 0.380
ROAE 0.001 −0.002 0 0.200
CASH_TA 0.100 0.100 0 0.100
DIV 0.098 0.088 0.010 0.190









Control variables (−1) Yes Yes
Bank FE No Yes
Cluster SE Bank Yes Yes
N. of obs. 159 159
(continued)
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Table 5. Continued.
Panel D – Univariate statistics: DTD before and after the directive
Before the directive Difference After the directive Difference
Variable Treated (T) Control (C) (T-C) Treated (T) Control (C) (T-C)
DTD 2.80 2.70 0.10 2.96 2.81 0.15∗∗
Notes: This table provides the results of our differences-in-differences strategy based on the Directive 2014/95/EU. Firstly (Panel A) we employ a
propensity score matching (PSM) procedure (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983) to reduce the potential bias arising from heterogeneity of treated
(T) and control (C) groups, employing all non-binary bank-level controls (SIZE, ETA, LLR_GL, CIR, ROAE, CASH_TA, DIV). The dependent variable
(D_HIGH_ESG) equals 1 for banks above average values of ESG scores (treated) and 0 otherwise. Panel B provides the univariate statistics on the
effectiveness of the PSM procedure. Panel C shows the results of the DID estimation for both an OLS (I) and a panel data estimation (II). Finally,
Panel D shows the DTD difference between treated and control entities before and after the Directive. The dependent variable is the one-year
Merton’s Distance to Default (DTD) as a proxy for stability. Target variables are: D_SHOCK, equal to 1 for years 2015–2017 (after the shock, i.e. the
publication of theDirective) and 0otherwise; D_TREATED, that takes value of 1 for banks abovemean values of ESG scores in the year of the shock
(2014), and 0 otherwise; the interaction term D_SHOCK∗D_TREATED. Variable definitions are provided in Table 1. All non-binary independent
variables are lagged by one year with respect to the dependent variable. The control variables based on accounting data (SIZE, ETA, LLR_GL, CIR,
ROAE, CASH_TA, DIV) are winsorized at the 1% level of each tail. Bank fixed-effects (FE) are included in all specifications. Bank clustered standard
errors (SE) are reported in parentheses. The superscripts ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote coefficients statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels, respectively, in two-tailed tests.
Table 6. Accounting for ESG disclosure duration and ESG score level.
DTD
Belowmean ESG score Above mean ESG score N. of years of ESG score disclosure
Variables (I) (II)
DTD (−1) 0.691∗∗∗ 0.771∗∗∗ 0.652∗∗∗
(0.106) (0.165) (0.078)
ESG (−1) −0.147 −0.067
(0.341) (0.179)






D_CRISIS −0.189 −0.265∗∗∗ −0.303∗∗
(0.122) (0.079) (0.063)
Control variables (−1) Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes
Cluster SE Bank Yes Yes Yes
N. of obs. 156 288 439
Hansen p-value 1.000 0.851 0.921
AR(2) 0.157 0.908 0.495
Notes: This table reports the estimates of the two-step systemGMMmodel obtained using as target variable inmodel (I) the
ESG score level (below vs above the sample mean of ESG score); and in model (II) the number of years of the bank’s ESG
scoredisclosure (ESG_Nyears). Each target variable is interactedwith thedummycrisis (D_CRISIS). Thedependent variable
is the one-year Merton’s Distance to Default (DTD) which measures bank stability. All bank and country control variables
are included in themodel. Variable definitions are provided in Table 1. The sample period observed is 2005–2017. All non-
binary independent variables are lagged by one year with respect to the dependent variable. The control variables based
on accountingdata (SIZE, ETA, LLR_GL, CIR, ROAE, CASH_TA, DIV) arewinsorized at the 1%of each tail. TheHansen p-value
is that of the Hansen test statistic of over-identifying restrictions, while AR(2) are the p-value of the first and second-order
autocorrelation test statistic. Bank fixed-effects (FE) are included in all specifications. Bank clustered standard errors (SE)
are reported in parentheses. The superscripts ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote coefficients statistically different from zero at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in two-tailed tests.
Moreover, we verify the robustness of results to potential endogeneity bias stemming from reverse causality,
omitted variables and measurement error. For instance, companies with better financial performance or more
stable, may be inclined to engage more in CSR (Bénabou and Tirole 2010; Chih, Chih, and Chen 2010). Our
results may be sensitive to the measures used for both bank stability and the ESG scores. We alleviate these
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concerns using both the instrumental variables (IV) two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator (Table 8) and the
two-step system GMM model based on an alternative definition of bank stability (Table 9) and ESG scores
(Table 10).
Table 7. Heckman two-step estimation results.





























Cluster SE Bank Yes
N. of obs. 608
Panel B. Second step of the Heckman two-step model
DTD
ESG score ESG score components

















D_CRISIS −0.294∗∗∗ −0.244∗∗∗ −0.257∗∗∗ −0.288∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.049) (0.064) (0.057)
Control variables (−1) Yes Yes Yes Yes
(continued)
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Table 7. Continued.
Panel B. Second step of the Heckman two-step model
DTD
ESG score ESG score components
Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV)
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster SE Bank Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. of obs. 608 608 608 608
IMR 0.410 0.129 0.395 0.347
(0.279) (0.168) (0.270) (0.237)
Notes: This table reports the results obtained from the Heckman two-step model over the period 2005–2017, with Panel A showing the first step
and Panel B the second one. The first step estimates the decision equation using a multinomial probit model, whose parameters are used to
calculate the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR). In this setting the dependent variables are dummies (D_ESG) equal to 1 from the year in which a bank of
our sample started to be involved in ESGpractices; and 0 in the previous years. The second step estimates the stability regressionwith the Inverse
Mills Ratio (IMR) generated by the first step. The dependent variable used in the second step is the one-year Merton’s Distance to Default (DTD)
which measures bank stability. The variables of interest in Panel B are: the ESG score – see model (I); and its three components (ENV, SOC and
GOV score) – see models (II), (III), and (IV), respectively. Each target variable is interacted with the dummy crisis (D_CRISIS). Variable definitions
are provided in Table 1. All non-binary independent variables are lagged by one year with respect to the dependent variable. Bank fixed-effects
(FE) are included in all specifications. Bank clustered standard errors (SE) are reported in parentheses. The control variables based on accounting
data (SIZE, ETA, LLR_GL, CIR, ROAE, CASH_TA, DIV) are winsorized at the 1% of each tail. The superscripts ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote coefficients
statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in two-tailed tests.
For the IV 2SLS, in the first stage we estimate the goodness, as an instrument for our target variable, of the
political orientation of each country (Hasan et al. 2018). The dummy variable Political_orient is equal to 1 for
firms headquartered in countries that voted for democrats or progressive political parties and 0 otherwise. The
rationale behind the selection of this instrument is that democrats or progressive political parties are more likely
to exert pressure on firms to adopt green and sustainable practices, while republican or conservators are not.
Therefore, political orientation of a country should be correlated with CSR (Cheung 2016; Hasan et al. 2018)
but is unlikely to have a significant effect on bank risk. To obtain the information about the country political
orientation in Europe, we employ the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) database (Polk et al. 2017).
As shown in Panel A of Table 8, these are all positively and significantly correlated with all instrumented
target variables. The Cragg-Donald F-test statistics are all higher than the critical value of 16.38, with p-values
smaller than 0.01 in all specifications. The weak instrument hypothesis test (i.e. testing for the relevance of the
IV in the first stage) and the higher F-test (lower p-values) indicate a rejection of the null: our IVs are strongly
correlated with our endogenous variables, supporting their validity. In the second stage (Panel B of Table 8), the
coefficients of our target variables (ESG, ENV, SOC, GOV) are all positive and statistically significant during
financial turmoil, confirming our baseline findings (Table 3).
Adopting only one market-based risk indicator (the distance to default) could be considered as a partial view
on our target relationship. Hence, we perform our estimations using as dependent variable the Z-score (Panel
A of Table 9), as well as its individual components (Panel B) as in Lepetit et al. (2008); Doumpos, Gaganis, and
Pasiouras (2015).
The Z–score is a widely used and reliable accounting-based alternative bank stability measure (Beck and
Laeven 2006; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 2010;Bartholdy and Justesen 2020, among others), calculated as the
sum of equity to total assets (ETA) and return on average assets (ROAA), scaled by the three–year standard
deviation of ROAA. Data for its computation is collected from Thomson Reuters and it measures the number
of standard deviations that profits can fall before a bank fails (Beck and Laeven 2006). Higher Z–score values
indicate a lower probability of insolvency and thus greater bank stability. Since the Z–score is highly skewed,
we use its natural logarithm (Laeven and Levine 2009). Table 9 shows how results are consistent with our main
findings.
We further test the consistency of our results using an alternative ESG score definition, provided by a different
provider (Bloomberg), in a two-step system GMM setting. The alternative ESG variables (BESG, BENV, BSOC
and BGOV) are built with a different methodology: the focus is on the level of transparency of information
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Table 8. IV 2SLS estimation results.
Panel A – First stage of the IV 2SLS model
ESG ENV SOC GOV
Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV)
Political_orient (−1) 0.063∗∗ 0.059∗ 0.055∗ 0.076∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.033) (0.031) (0.027)
D_CRISIS (−0.021) (−0.019) (−0.025) (−0.021)
(0.017) (0.026) (0.022) (0.020)
Control variables (−1) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster SE Bank Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. of obs. 547 547 547 547
F-Cragg Donald test 474.0∗∗∗ 2851.32∗∗∗ 400.36∗∗∗ 468.27∗∗∗
Panel B – Second stage of the IV 2SLS model
DTD
ESG score ESG score components

















D_CRISIS −0.313∗∗∗ −0.340∗∗∗ −0.328∗∗∗ −0.292∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.062) (0.053) (0.050)
Control variables (−1) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster SE Bank Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. of obs. 445 445 445 445
Sargan p-value 0.100 0.101 0.931 0.414
Notes: This table reports the results of the instrumental variables (IV) two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator model over the period 2005–2017.
In Panel A we report the results of the first stage of the IV 2SLS estimator, where we instrument each of our target variables (the ESG score
and its three components) with country political orientation (Political_orient) (Cheung, 2016; Hasan et al. 2018), showing their correlations and
goodness (the Cragg-Donald weak instruments F-test statistics) with reference to the original target variable being instrumented (ESG, ENV,
SOC and GOV scores). The dependent variables for the first stage are: ESG, ENV, SOC, and GOV scores in columns (I), (II), (III), (IV), respectively.
Panel B provides the results of the second stage of the IV 2SLS where we replace the potentially endogenous interest variables with the results
of the first stage, including the Sargan test (Sargan p-value) of over-identifying restrictions. The dependent variable for the second stage is the
one-year Merton’s Distance to Default (DTD) which measures bank stability. Variable definitions are provided in Table 1. All bank and country
control variables are included in themodel. All non-binary independent variables are lagged by one yearwith respect to the dependent variable.
Accounting-based control variables (SIZE, ETA, LLR_GL, CIR, ROAE, CASH_TA, DIV) arewinsorized at the 1%of each tail. Bank fixed-effects (FE) are
included in all specifications. Bank clustered standard errors (SE) are reported in parentheses. The superscripts∗∗∗,∗∗, and∗denote coefficients
statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in two-tailed tests.
disclosed by reporting entities. In Table 10, model (I) refers to BESG, the score capturing the overall score, model
(II) onBENV (carbon emissions, climate change effects, pollutionwaste disposal, renewable energy and resource
depletion), model (III) on BSOC (supply chain, discrimination, political contributions, diversity, human rights
and community relations), andmodel (IV) onBGOV(cumulative voting, executive compensation, shareholders’
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Table 9. Baseline model with an alternative bank stability measure.
Panel A: The Z-score
Z-score
ESG score ESG score components
Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV)
Z-score (−1) 0.849∗∗∗ 0.825∗∗∗ 0.827∗∗∗ 0.800∗∗∗

















D_CRISIS −0.680∗∗∗ −0.668∗∗∗ −0.658∗∗∗ −0.649∗∗∗
(0.202) (0.199) (0.202) (0.187)
Control variables (−1) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster SE Bank Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. of obs. 469 469 469 469
Hansen p-value 0.867 0.866 0.881 0.878
AR(2) 0.543 0.537 0.595 0.433
Panel B: Z-score components
STD_ROAA ROAA ETA
Variables (I) (II) (III)
Dependent Variable (−1) 0.721∗∗∗ 0.347∗∗∗ 3.089
(0.037) (0.073) (4.904)
ESG (−1) 0.001 −0.001 −0.007
(0.001) (0.001) (0.049)
ESG (−1) ∗ D_CRISIS −0.001∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.012
(0.0003) (0.001) (0.037)
D_CRISIS −0.312∗∗∗ −0.288∗∗∗ −0.292∗∗∗
(0.093) (0.093) (0.081)
Control variables (−1) Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes
Cluster SE Bank Yes Yes Yes
N. of obs. 481 504 504
Hansen p-value 0.959 0.999 0.880
AR(2) 0.290 0.338 0.949
Notes: This table reports the estimates of the two-step system GMM model during the period 2005–2017 substituting the market-based bank
stability measure (DTD) with an accounting-based widely used alternative (Z-Score) (Panel A) and its components (Panel B). It is calculated as
the sum of equity to total assets (ETA) and return on average assets (ROAA), scaled by the three–year standard deviation of ROAA (STD_ROAA).
Since the Z-score is highly skewed, we use its natural logarithm (Laeven and Levine 2009; Liu et al., 2013). Data for its computation is collected
from Thomson Reuters. The variables of interest are the ESG score (see model (I)), and its three components (ENV, SOC and GOV score) (see
models (II), (III), and (IV)), respectively. Each target variable is interactedwith the dummy crisis (D_CRISIS). All bank and country control variables
are included in the model. Variable definitions are provided in Table 1 and A1 (in Appendix). The sample period observed is 2005–2017. All
non-binary independent variables are lagged by one year with respect to the dependent variable. The control variables based on accounting
data (SIZE, ETA, LLR_GL, CIR, ROAE, CASH_TA, DIV) are winsorized at the 1% of each tail. The Hansen p-value is that of the Hansen test statistic
of over-identifying restrictions, while AR(2) are the p-value of the first and second-order autocorrelation test statistic. Bank fixed-effects (FE) are
included in all specifications. Bank clustered standard errors (SE) are reported in parentheses. The superscripts∗∗∗,∗∗, and∗denote coefficients
statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in two-tailed tests.
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Table 10. Baseline model with an alternative ESG score definition.
DTD
BESG score BESG score components
Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV)
DTD (−1) 0.593∗∗∗ 0.624∗∗∗ 0.633∗∗∗ 0.614∗∗∗

















D_CRISIS −0.268∗∗∗ −0.276∗∗∗ −0.275∗∗∗ −0.280∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.056) (0.058) (0.056)
Control variables (−1) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster SE Bank Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. of obs. 316 316 316 316
Hansen p-value 0.983 0.991 0.987 0.980
AR(2) 0.509 0.704 0.747 0.704
Notes: This table reports the estimates of the two-step system GMMmodel obtained
using an alternative definition of ESG score provided by Bloomberg database. In
model (I) BESG is the ESG score that captures the transparency level of information
disclosed about sustainable practices on Environmental, Social and Governance
aspects. In model (II) BENV consists of corporate rating about the level of disclosed
information on the following issues: carbon emission, climate change effect, pollu-
tion waste disposal, renewable energy, and resource depletion. In model (III) BSOC
consists of corporate rating about the level of disclosed information on the follow-
ing issues: supply chain, discrimination, political contributions, diversity, human
rights, and community relations. In model (IV) BGOV consists of corporate rating
about the level of disclosed information on the following issues: cumulative voting,
executive compensation, shareholder’s right, takeover defence, staggered boards,
and independent directors. Each target variable is interactedwith the dummy crisis
(D_CRISIS). The dependent variable is the one-year Merton’s Distance to Default
(DTD) which measures bank stability. All bank and country control variables are
included in the model. Variable definitions are provided in Table 1. The sample
period observed is 2005–2017. All non-binary independent variables are lagged
by one year with respect to the dependent variable. The control variables based
on accounting data (SIZE, ETA, LLR_GL, CIR, ROAE, CASH_TA, DIV) are winsorized at
the 1% of each tail. The Hansen p-value is that of the Hansen test statistic of over-
identifying restrictions, while AR(2) are the p-value of the first and second-order
autocorrelation test statistic. Bank fixed-effects (FE) are included in all specifica-
tions. Bank clustered standard errors (SE) are reported in parentheses. The super-
scripts ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote coefficients statistically different from zero at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in two-tailed tests.
rights, takeover defence, staggered boards and independent directors). We find again support for our baseline
findings.
Since our analysis relies on a heterogenous cross–country sample of European banks, we further test
its robustness by performing several additional analyses in our baseline econometric setting on specific
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Table 11. Baseline model for different sub-samples.
DTD















DTD (−1) 0.892∗∗∗ 0.064 1.533 0.702∗∗∗ 0.625∗∗∗ 0.601∗∗∗
(0.165) (0.449) (1.246) (0.125) (0.178) (0.177)
ESG (−1) −0.086 −0.643 −2.943 −0.031 −0.127 −0.341
(0.197) (0.909) (8.437) (0.244) (0.309) (0.626)
ESG (−1)∗D_CRISIS 0.415∗∗∗ 0.066 −5.203 0.277∗∗∗ 0.222∗ 0.375∗∗∗
(0.106) (0.339) (6.520) (0.101) (0.131) (0.138)
D_CRISIS −0.284∗∗∗ −0.220∗ −0.418 −0.328∗∗∗ −0.207 −0.328∗∗∗
(0.089) (0.122) (0.381) (0.059) (0.139) (0.071)
Control variables (−1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster SE Bank Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. of obs. 299 140 113 326 253 186
Hansen p-value 0.590 0.997 0.874 0.880 0.972 0.543
AR(2) 0.666 0.523 0.885 0.960 0.122 0.132
Notes: This table reports the estimates of two-step system GMM model tested employing different sub-samples that control for: the bank size
(banks subjected to the EBA stress testing 2014 exercise vs those that are not subjected); the orientation of the financial system (below vs above
the sample mean of the ratio of domestic credit provided by banking sector to GDP); and the income level of the country (below vs above the
samplemean of GDP per capita). The dependent variable is the one-year Merton’s Distance to Default (DTD) whichmeasures bank stability. The
target variable is the ESG score. It is interactedwith the dummycrisis (D_CRISIS). All bank and country control variables are included in themodel.
Variable definitions are provided in Table 1. The sample period is 2005–2017. All non-binary independent variables are lagged by one year with
respect to the dependent variable. The control variables based on accounting data (SIZE, ETA, LLR_GL, CIR, ROAE, CASH_TA, DIV) are winsorised
at the 1% of each tail. The Hansen p-value is that of the Hansen test statistic of over-identifying restrictions, while AR(2) are the p-value of the
first and second-order autocorrelation test statistic. Bank fixed-effects (FE) are included in all specifications. Bank clustered standard errors (SE)
are reported in parentheses. The superscripts ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote coefficients statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively, in two-tailed tests.
sub-samples, to assess whether the ESG–bank risk linkage varies significantly due to banks’ characteristics or
different operating environments.
As shown inTable 11, we find that only the largest European banking groups subject to the periodic EBA stress
testing exercise show the association between stability and ESG scores during crisis periods. This result is sup-
portive of the European regulatory effort towards both listed and larger entities (including banks) in enhancing
non-financial disclosures.
Our evidence also indicates that, in times of crisis, ESG strategies play a beneficial role for financial stability
only in bank-oriented financial systems, where systemic risks could pose a greater threat (Table 11). A possible
explanation is that ESG practices are of particular relevance in providing several competitive advantages, such
as enhancing a bank’s reputation, which is a crucial factor in withstanding both financial turmoil and the poten-
tial lack of trust arising from it. On the other side, a market-oriented system could be able to provide market
discipline more frequently and gradually through pricing effects, showing a limited response during financial
turmoil.
Furthermore, we observe (Table 11) that ESG scores have a positive association with financial stability only
for those banks located in European countries with higher income levels based on average GDP per capita.
This result could be an additional evidence on the greater sensitivity towards sustainability that is achieved
at higher levels of economic development (even if we do not consider emerging countries). At the same time,
richer countries engage in ESG activities sooner than others, achieving already a sufficient level to obtain stability
benefits before the financial crisis hit. However, this result should be interpreted with caution since we do not
investigate the cause–effect direction of this relationship.
Additionally, we run our baselinemodel usingCountry-Level Index of Financial Stress (CLIFS) and its annual
variation (CLIFS) as alternative measures of the financial crisis. The CLIFS index is composed by six market-
based financial stress measures, aimed at capturing equities, bonds and foreign exchange co-movements during
financial turmoil. The CLIFS index is provided on a monthly frequency by the ECB: we annualized it by taking
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Table 12. Alternative measure of the crisis: the country-level index of financial stress (CLIFS).
DTD
Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
DTD (−1) 0.722∗∗∗ 0.691∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗ 0.840∗∗∗ 0.800∗∗∗ 0.800∗∗∗
(0.077) (0.051) (0.069) (0.072) (0.067) (0.067)
ESG (−1) −0.098 −0.123 −0.0705 0.00890 0.0211 0.0211
(0.126) (0.077) (0.123) (0.112) (0.111) (0.111)
ESG ∗ CLIFS (−1) 0.869∗∗ 0.674∗∗ 0.730∗
(0.417) (0.322) (0.407)
ESG ∗ CLIFS (−1) 0.182∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.052) (0.052)
CLIFS (−1) −0.959∗∗∗ −0.914∗∗∗ −1.027∗∗∗
(0.256) (0.160) (0.247)
CLIFS (−1) −0.144∗∗∗ −0.153∗∗∗ −0.153∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Control variables (−1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Country FE No No Yes No No Yes
Cluster SE Bank Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. of obs. 368 368 368 368 368 368
Hansen p-value 0.989 0.891 0.880 0.150 0.765 0.795
AR(2) 0.401 0.827 0.817 0.467 0.525 0.535
Notes: This table reports the estimates of the two-step system GMMmodel during the period 2005–2017 by using the Country-Level
Index of Financial Stress (CLIFS) as alternativemeasure of financial market turmoil. The dependent variable is the one-year Merton’s
Distance toDefault (DTD)whichmeasures bank stability. The variables of interest are the ESG score and its interactionwith either the
level (CLIFS) or the annual variation of the index (CLIFS). Variable definitions are provided in Table 1. All non-binary independent
variables are lagged by one year with respect to the dependent variable. The control variables based on accounting data (SIZE, ETA,
LLR_GL, CIR, ROAE, CASH_TA,DIV) arewinsorised at the 1%of each tail. TheHansenp-value is that of theHansen test statistic of over-
identifying restrictions, while AR(2) are the p-value of the first and second-order autocorrelation test statistic. Bank fixed-effects (FE)
are always included, whereas year and country FE are either included or excluded in columns from (I) to (VI). Bank clustered standard
errors (SE) are reported in parentheses. The superscripts ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote coefficients statistically different from zero at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in two-tailed tests.
the 12-month average values to adapt it to the yearly frequency of our dataset. Following Hollo, Kremer, and Lo
Duca (2012) and Duprey, Klaus, and Peltonen (2017), the CLIFS is standardized using the empirical cumulative
density function (CDF) over a 10-year window to ensure both cross-country comparability and a sufficient
cover of financial stress events. Table 12 reports the results of this additional test. The coefficients of interest
ESG∗CLIFS and ESG∗CLIFS are statistically significant and strongly positively correlated with bank stability,
also when including time and country fixed effects. Overall, this additional analysis furtherly corroborates our
baseline results.
As we are interested in testing the effect of ESG scores on banks’ stability during financial turmoil in Europe,
it is useful to disentangle if the relationship differs for: (i) the subprime crisis, which took place in 2008–2009; (ii)
the European sovereign debt crisis, which took place from 2010 to 2012. To this aim, we create two dummy vari-
ables: the SUB_CRISIS, which takes the value of 1 for years 2008–2009 and 0 otherwise, and the SOV_CRISIS,
which equals 1 for years 2010–2012, and 0 otherwise. Then, we interact these variables with banks’ ESG scores.
Results are provided in Table 13.
As expected, we find significant negative associations between ESG and DTD that seems slightly stronger
during the subprime crisis, as demonstrated by the magnitude of the coefficients. This evidence could be related
to fact that, by differentiating loan spreads between firms more or less exposed to environmental issues (as
demonstrated by e.g. Chen et al. 2020), banks with higher responsibility could benefit from lower risks (see e.g
Zhou et al. 2021), especially when the turmoil originates in the credit market.
Finally, a question arises as to whether there are potential non-linearities in our relationships of interest.
Similarly to Azmi et al. (2021)’s study on ESG and bank performance in emerging markets, we run several
additional tests to check for potential non-linear effects during the crisis period and foundno evidence of them.14
26 L. CHIARAMONTE ET AL.
Table 13. Subprime vs Sovereign crisis.
DTD
Variables (I) (II) (III)
DTD (−1) 0.714∗∗∗ 0.726∗∗∗ 0.717∗∗∗
(0.140) (0.127) (0.084)
ESG (−1) −0.041 −0.017 −0.016
(0.246) (0.178) (0.167)
ESG (−1) ∗ SUB_CRISIS 0.591∗∗∗ 0.506∗∗ 0.504∗∗
(0.213) (0.225) (0.207)
ESG (−1) ∗ SOV_CRISIS 0.228∗∗ 0.211∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗
(0.099) (0.094) (0.080)
SUB_CRISIS −0.271∗∗∗ −0.269∗∗∗ −0.269∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.097) (0.069)
SOV_CRISIS −0.312∗∗∗ −0.288∗∗∗ −0.292∗∗∗
(0.093) (0.093) (0.081)
Control variables (−1) Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes
Country FE No No Yes
Cluster SE Bank Yes Yes Yes
N. of obs. 439 439 439
Hansen p-value 0.959 0.999 0.880
AR(2) 0.290 0.338 0.949
Notes: This table reports the estimates of the two-step system GMM
model during the period 2005–2017. The dependent variable is the
one-year Merton’s Distance to Default (DTD) which measures bank
stability. The variables of interest are: the ESG score (see model
(I), (II), and (III)), respectively, and its interaction with the follow-
ing dummy variables: (1) the SUB_CRISIS which takes the value of
1 for the year 2008–2009 and 0 otherwise; (2) the SOV_CRISIS which
takes the value of 1 for the years 2010–2012 and 0 otherwise. Vari-
able definitions are provided in Table 1. All non-binary independent
variables are lagged by one year with respect to the dependent
variable. The control variables based on accounting data (SIZE, ETA,
LLR_GL, CIR, ROAE, CASH_TA, DIV) are winsorised at the 1% of each
tail. The Hansen p-value is that of the Hansen test statistic of over-
identifying restrictions, while AR(2) are the p-value of the first and
second-order autocorrelation test statistic. Bank fixed-effects (FE)
are always included,whereas year and country FE are either included
or excluded in columns from (I) to (III). Bank clustered standard errors
(SE) are reported in parentheses. The superscripts ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗
denote coefficients statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels, respectively, in two-tailed tests.
However we believe that more research is needed in this area as the differences across our data sample both in
terms of time span and countries under investigation, do not allow a direct comparison.
6. Conclusions
This paper empirically investigates the joint and separate effects of environmental, social, and governance scores
(ESG) on bank stability for the European banking sector. The long sample period (2005–2017) includes the
global financial and European sovereign debt crises and allows us to verify whether the effect on bank stability
depends on the economic cycle, while controlling for bank- and country-specific variables.We hypothesize that,
during a financial crisis: (i) banks with higher ESG scores are less risky; (ii) environmental activism reduces
bank risk-taking; (iii) bank instability is inversely related to the level of social engagement; (iv) fair governance
practices positively affect bank stability; and (v) the EU 2014Non-Financial ReportingDirective rewarded banks
more engaged in CSR practices.
We find that both the composite ESG score and its individual pillars reduce bank fragility, with a higher
impact for the social dimension. This effect emerges during crises periods and is robust to selection bias and
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endogeneity issues. Our evidence is supportive of the predictions of the stakeholder theory and supports the
idea that moral capital creates value and resilience for firms.
When we further disentangle the components of each ESG pillar, our results show that greater effects are
attributable to environmental innovation, the fair treatment of the workforce, product responsibility and the
equal treatment of shareholders. We also show that the positive ESG-bank stability linkage holds especially for
banks with higher ESG scores, both by splitting our sample, as well as exploiting the EU 2014 NFRD as a shock
in a differences-in-differences setting. Additionally, we find that the effect is stronger the longer the duration of
disclosures. These results imply that the benefits of sustainability practices are contingent on the level of a bank’s
engagement in ESG practices, but also on a longer commitment.
Finally, we find that ESG ratings exert a different impact on stability depending on the characteristics of banks
and their operating environments. Only the largest European banking groups seem to obtain benefits on finan-
cial stability during crisis periods. This result is supportive of the recent European regulatory requirement on
enhanced non-financial disclosures enforced for public-interest institutions, including banks. We also find that,
in times of crisis, ESG strategies play a beneficial role for financial stability in bank-oriented financial systems,
where systemic risks may pose a greater threat, as well as in European countries with higher income levels, that
could be more sensitive to sustainability issues or may have engaged in related practices earlier.
This paper provides evidence that ESG strategies could act as an insurance-like risk mitigation device for
banks during periods of financial distress. A possible explanation is that engaging in environmental, social,
and corporate governance practices seems to be associated with more prudent banking activities, fostering a
more stable relationships with reference communities and enhancing a bank’s reputation. Hence, our findings
confirm that enhancing ESG engagement in the banking sector is not only beneficial in terms of its impact on the
environment and the society but is also able to strengthen the resilience of the banking sector when a financial
crisis occurs.
Overall, our evidence reveals that, beyond the traditional regulatory approach, focusing onESG issuesmatters
in the banking sector and corroborates the proposal, advanced by the European Banking Authority, to include
ESG considerationswithin supervisory frameworks. Additionally, integrating sustainability practices into banks’
internal processes to enhance stability should constitute an interesting suggestion also for a sound management
of credit institutions.
In terms of policy implications, our results suggest that sustainability practices require strong efforts and
relatively long periods of time before they provide a benefit on stability. How to improve such benefits or how
to extend them to smaller institutions, are open questions for policymakers that should be addressed in future
academic research.
Notes
1. There is no unique definition of CSR (McWilliams and Siegel 2001; Hill et al. 2007; Dahlsrud 2008): the European Commission
(2011) defines it as ‘the responsibility of enterprises for the impact on society [. . . ] to integrate social, environmental, ethi-
cal, human rights and consumer concerns into their business operations and core strategy in close collaboration with their
stakeholders’.
2. For many years, the debate in the literature around CSR was mainly theoretical and based either (i) on the shareholder view
of the firm (Friedman 1970) that considers CSR activities as a cost; or (ii) the stakeholder view (Freeman 1984) that sees them
primarily as an ethical obligation (see also Garriga and Melé 2004).
3. In 2017 the European Commission adopted detailed non-binding guidelines on the disclosure of non-financial information to
improve business transparency on social and environmental matters and ensure consistency and comparability across compa-
nies (2017/C 215/01). Sustainability reporting is also at the heart of the so-called ‘European Green Deal’ that is an action plan
of the European Commission with the objective to make Europe the world’s first climate-neutral continent by 2050.
4. Specifically, an online document (Bank of England 2021b) that summarizes the key elements of the UK 2021 biennial
exploratory scenario states that: ‘The financial risks from climate change affect the safety and soundness of firms the Bank
regulates and the stability of the wider financial system that it oversees. Climate-related financial risks therefore have a direct
impact on the delivery of the Bank’s macroprudential and microprudential policy objectives [. . . ]’
5. Several studies find that improvements in CSR can benefit firms’ relationships with stakeholders, lower the vulnerability to
reputational risks and enhance the long-term business sustainability (Becchetti, Ciciretti, and Hasan 2015). The commitment
to CSR can be used as an alternative risk hedging and mitigation tool (Peloza 2006). Swanda (1990), for example, views the
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results of moral behaviour as a capital asset and emphasizes the strategic importance of preserving and advancing a firm’s
moral capital.
6. In recent years, a variety of ESG indices measuring firm-level CSR performance have been constructed using different rating
methodologies (e.g., some are based on a box-ticking approach – ‘compliance’, while others are based on interpretative analysis
– ‘engagement’).
7. To further assess the robustness of our results with respect to the estimationmethods, we also employ a bank fixed-effects panel
data regression model with clustered standard errors at the bank level and results, unreported and available upon request, are
broadly confirmed.
8. For robustness, we also used an alternative market-based bank risk measure, i.e. the one-year Merton’s probability of default
(PD). Results are qualitatively similar and available upon request.
9. As a robustness test, we perform our analysis also using a dummy crisis variable that ends in 2013 rather than 2012. The results
are qualitatively similar and available upon request. Due to the limited number of observations, it was not feasible to divide our
sample period (2005–2017) into sub-periods (pre–crisis, crisis, post–crisis).
10. As a potential alternative to the interaction term, sample splitting could bias the results due to sub-sample specific covariates that
can obfuscate the treatment effect and may also reduce the number of observations. However, in an unreported test, we verify
the consistency of our results by running the baseline model without the interaction term and results are broadly confirmed.
11. The VLTROs are considered the ECB’s largest liquidity injections ever, with more than one trillion Euro introduced in the
Eurozone banking system in two tranches (VLTRO1 in 2011Q4, VLTROs in 2012Q1, both ended in 2015Q1).
12. Thomson Reuters’ Refinitiv is an enhancement and replacement to the Thomson Reuters’ ASSET4 ratings, which has been
widely used in previous CSR studies (Cheng, Ioannou, and Serafeim 2014; Eccles et al. 2015; El Ghoul and Karoui 2017; among
others). We start our sample in 2005 due to the low coverage on ESG scores in previous years.
13. The same issue occurs when collecting ESG scores data from Bloomberg database. In this case, the level of coverage is lower
and, more importantly, less granular information on ESG constituents is present. However, as robustness tests, we perform our
analysis also using Bloomberg as a data source: our results hold also in this setting (see Section 5). Moreover, although widely
used in previous related studies on corporate social performance (e.g., Jiao 2010; El Ghoul et al. 2011; among others), it was
not possible to use the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) ESG database (formerly known as Kinder, Lyndenberg,
and Domini Research and Analytics Inc. (KLD) database), because, except for the most recent years, it does not provide data
on European countries (Sassen, Hinze, and Hardeck 2016).
14. We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this analysis. Results are not reported but are available with the authors.
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to the Editor Chris Adcock and two anonymous referees for their helpful and constructive comments that greatly
improved the paper. We thank conference and seminar participants at the 3rd Social Impact Investment Conference (University
of Rome 2019); 3rd Conference on Contemporary Issues in Banking (University of St Andrews 2019); International Workshop of
Financial SystemWorkshop of Financial System Architecture and Stability (Bayes Business School, 2020); 1st Annual Boca Corpo-
rate Finance and Governance Conference (Florida Atlantic University 2020); University of Birmingham (2020) and Kings College
London (2020); and in particular, Ettore Croci, and discussants: Giovanni Ferri, Franco Fiordelisi, Yrjo Koskinen andMarcel Lukas.
The paper won the best paper award at the 3rd Social Impact Investment Conference (University of Rome 2019). All remaining
errors are our own.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes on contributor
Claudia Girardone is Professor of Banking and Finance at Essex Business School of the University of Essex where she is Director
of the Essex Finance Centre (EFiC) and the School’s Director of Research. Claudia’s research areas are on banking sector financial
and social performance, bank corporate governance and stability, the industrial structure of banking and access to finance. She has
published over 50 articles in books and peer-reviewed international journals. She is a co-author of the textbook “Introduction to
Banking” (Pearson, 2015) and she is currently on the editorial board of several journals, including the Journal of Financial Economic








Albertini, E. 2013. “Does Environmental Management Improve Financial Performance? A Meta-Analytical Review.” Organization
& Environment 26 (4): 431–457.
Allen, F., E. Carletti, and R. Marquez. 2011. “Credit Market Competition and Capital Regulation.” Review of Financial Studies 24
(4): 983–1018.
Anginer, D., A. Demirguc-Kunt, H. Huizinga, and K. Ma. 2018. “Corporate Governance of Banks and Financial Stability.” Journal
of Financial Economics 130 (2): 327–346.
Aramburu, I. A., and I. G. Pescador. 2017. “The Effects of Corporate Social Responsibility on Customer Loyalty: The Mediating
Effect of Reputation in Cooperative Banks Versus Commercial Banks in the Basque Country.” Journal of Business Ethics 154 (3):
701–719.
Arellano, M., and O. Bover. 1995. “Another Look at the Instrumental Variable Estimation of Error-Components Models.” Journal
of Econometrics 68: 29–51.
Attig, N., S. El Ghoul, O. Guedhami, and J. Suh. 2013. “Corporate Social Responsibility and Credit Ratings.” Journal of Business
Ethics 117 (4): 679–694.
Azmi,W.,M. K.Hassan, R.Houston, andM. S. Karim. 2021. “ESGActivities and Banking Performance: International Evidence from
Emerging Economies.” Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money 70, doi:10.1016/j.intfin.2020.101277.
Bae, K. H., S. El Ghoul, O. Guedhami, C. C. Y. Kwok, and Y. Zheng. 2018. “Does Corporate Social Responsibility Reduce the Costs
of High Leverage? Evidence from Capital Structure and Product Market Interactions.” Journal of Banking and Finance 100 (C):
135–150.
Bank of England. 2021a. “Guidance for Participants of the 2021 Biennial Exploratory Scenario: Financial Risks from Climate
Change.” June.
Bank of England. 2021b. “Key Elements of the 2021 Biennial Exploratory Scenario: Financial Risks fromClimate Change.” Available
Online.
Barnea, A., and A. Rubin. 2010. “Corporate Social Responsibility as a Conflict Between Shareholders.” Journal of Business Ethics 97:
71–86.
Barth, J. R., G. J. Caprio, and R. Levine. 2008. “Bank Regulation are Changing: But for Better orWorse?”World Bank Policy Research
Working Paper, No. 4646.
Bartholdy, J., and L. G. Justesen. 2020. “Can Strong Capital Regulation Prevent Risk-Taking fromDeposit Insurance?” The European
Journal of Finance, 1–22.
Bassen, A., and A. M.M. Kovacs. 2008. “Environmental, Social and Governance Key Performance Indicators from a Capital Market
Perspective.” Zeitschrift fur Wirtschafts-und Unternehmensethik 9 (2): 182–192.
Bauer, R., J. Derwall, and R. Otten. 2007. “The Ethical Mutual Fund Performance Debate: New Evidence from Canada.” Journal of
Business Ethics 70: 111–124.
Becchetti, L., R. Ciciretti, and I. Hasan. 2015. “Corporate Social Responsibility, Stakeholder and Idiosyncratic Risk.” Journal of
Corporate Finance 35: 297–209.
Beck, T., A. Demirgüç-Kunt, and R. Levine. 2010. “Financial Institutions and Markets Across Countries and Over Time: The
Updated Financial Development and Structure Database.”World Bank Economic Review 24 (1): 77–92.
Beck, T., and L. Laeven. 2006. “Resolution of Failed Banks by Deposit Insurers: Cross-Country Evidence.” Policy ResearchWorking
Paper Series 3920, The World Bank.
Beltratti, A., and R.M. Stulz. 2012. “TheCredit Crisis Around theGlobe:WhyDid SomeBanks PerformBetter?” Journal of Financial
Economics 105: 1–17.
Bénabou, R., and J. Tirole. 2010. “Individual and Corporate Social Responsibility.” Economica 77 (305): 1–19.
Berger, A. N., B. R. Imbierowicz, and C. Rauch. 2016. “The Roles of Corporate Governance in Bank Failures During the Recent
Financial Crisis.” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 48 (4): 729–770.
Bhandari, A., and D. Javakhadze. 2017. “Corporate Social Responsibility and Capital Allocation Efficiency.” Journal of Corporate
Finance 43: 354–377.
Bias, B., H. Heider, and M. Hoerova. 2016. “Risk-Sharing or Risk-Taking? Counterparty Risk, Incentives, and Margins.” Journal of
Finance 71: 1669–1698.
Blundell, R., and S. Bond. 1998. “Initial Conditions and Moment Restrictions in Dynamic Panel Data Models.” Journal of
Econometrics 87: 115–143.
Bouslah, K., L. Kryzanowski, and B. M’Zali. 2013. “The Impact of Dimensions of Social Performance on Firm Risk.” Journal of
Banking and Finance 37: 1258–1273.
Bouslah, K., L. Kryzanowski, and B. M’Zali. 2018. “Social Performance and Firm Risk: The Impact of the Financial Crisis.” Journal
of Business Ethics 49: 643–669.
Boutin-Dufresne, F., and P. Savaria. 2004. “Corporate Social Responsibility and Financial Risk.” The Journal of Investing 13: 57–66.
Buston, C. S. 2016. “Active Risk Management and Banking Stability.” Journal of Banking and Finance 72 (S): 203–215.
30 L. CHIARAMONTE ET AL.
Cespa, G., and G. Cestone. 2007. “Corporate Social Responsibility and Managerial Entrenchment.” Journal of Economics and
Management Strategy 16 (3): 741–771.
Chang, C. H., S. S. Chen, Y. S. Chen, and S. C. Peng. 2019. “Commitment to Build Trust by Socially Responsible Firms: Evidence
from Cash Holdings.” Journal of Corporate Finance 56: 364–387.
Chang, K., I. Kim, and Y. Li. 2014. “The Heterogeneous Impact of Corporate Social Responsibility Activities That Target Different
Stakeholders.” Journal of Business Ethics 125: 211–234.
Chen, I.-J., I. Hasan, C.-Y. Lin, and T. N. V. Nguyen. 2020. “Do Banks Value Borrowers’ Environmental Record? Evidence from
Financial Contracts.” Journal of Business Ethics, doi:10.1007/s10551-020-04621-2.
Chen, Y. C., M. Hung, and Y. Wang. 2018. “The Effect of Mandatory CSR Disclosure on Firm Profitability and Social Externalities:
Evidence from China.” Journal of Accounting and Economics 65: 169-190.
Cheng, B., I. Ioannou, andG. Serafeim. 2014. “Corporate Social Responsibility andAccess to Finance.” StrategicManagement Journal
35 (1): 1–23.
Chiaramonte, L., F. Poli, and M. E. Oriani. 2015. “Are Cooperative Banks a Lever for Promoting Bank Stability? Evidence from the
Recent Financial Crisis in OECD Countries.” European Financial Management 21 (3): 491–523.
Chih, H., H. Chih, and T. Chen. 2010. “On the Determinants of Corporate Social Responsibility: International Evidence on the
Financial Industry.” Journal of Business Ethics 93: 115–135.
Clarkson, P., Y. Li, M. Pinnuck, and G. Richardson. 2015. “The Valuation Relevance of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the
European Union Carbon Emissions Trading Scheme.” European Accounting Review 24 (3): 551–580.
Cornett,M.M.,O. Erhemjamts, andH.Tehranian. 2016. “Greed orGoodDeeds: AnExamination of theRelationBetweenCorporate
Social Responsibility and the Financial Performance of U.S. Commercial Banks Around the Financial Crisis.” Journal of Banking
and Finance 70: 137–159.
Crifo, P., V. D. Forget, and S. Teyssie. 2015. “The Price of Environmental, Social andGovernance Practice Disclosure: An Experiment
with Professional Private Equity Investors.” Journal of Corporate Finance 30: 168–194.
Dahlsrud, A. 2008. “How Corporate Social Responsibility is Defined: An Analysis of 37 Definitions.” Corporate Social Responsibility
and Environmental Management 15: 1–13.
Davis, I., and E. Stephenson. 2006. “Ten Trend to Watch in 2006.” The Mckinsey Quarterly 1: 1–5.
Dell’Atti, S., A. Trotta, A. P. Iannuzzi, and F. Demaria. 2017. “Corporate Social Responsibility Engagement as a Determinant of Bank
Reputation: An Empirical Analysis.” Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management 24: 589–605.
Demirgüç-Kunt, A., and H. Huizinga. 2010. “Bank Activity and Funding Strategies: The Impact on Risk and Returns.” Journal of
Financial Economics 98 (3): 626–650.
Dixon-Fowler, H. R., D. J. Slater, J. L. Johnson, A. E. Ellstrand, and A. M. Romi. 2013. “Beyond ‘Does It Pay to be Green?’ A Meta-
Analysis of Moderators of the CEP–CFP Relationship.” Journal of Business Ethics 112 (2): 353–366.
Doumpos, M., C. Gaganis, and F. Pasiouras. 2015. “Central Bank Independence, Financial Supervision Structure and Bank
Soundness: An Empirical Analysis Around the Crisis.” Journal of Banking and Finance 61: S69–S83.
Dowell, G., H. Stuart, and B. Yeung. 2000. “Do Corporate Global Environmental Standards Create or Destroy Market Value?”
Management Science 46 (8): 1059–1074.
Dowling, G. 2006. “Reputation Risk: It is the Board’s Ultimate Responsibility.” Journal of Business Strategy 27 (2): 59–68.
Ducassy, I. 2013. “Does Corporate Social Responsibility pay off in Times of Crisis? An Alternate Perspective on the Relationship
Between Financial and Corporate Social Performance.” Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management 20 (3):
157–167.
Duprey, T., B. Klaus, and T. Peltonen. 2017. “Dating Systemic Financial Stress Episodes in the EU Countries.” Journal of Financial
Stability 32: 30–56.
Eccles, R. G., J. Herron, and G. Serafeim. 2015. “Reliable Sustainability Ratings: The Influence of Business Models on Information
Intermediaries.” In The Routledge Handbook of Responsible Investment, edited by N. Beinisch, A. Hoepner, and T. Hebb, 620–631.
New York: Taylor & Francis Ltd.
Eccles, R. G., I. Ioannou, and G. Serafeim. 2014. “The Impact of Corporate Sustainability on Organizational Processes and
Performance.”Management Science 60: 2835–2857.
Edmans, A. 2011. “Does the Stock Market Fully Value Intangibles? Employee Satisfaction and Equity Prices.” Journal of Financial
Economics 101: 621–640.
Edmans, A. 2012. “The Link Between Job Satisfaction and Firm Value, with Implications for Corporate Social Responsibility.”
Academy of Management Perspectives 26: 1–19.
Edmans, A., L. Li, and C. Zhang. 2014. “Employee Satisfaction, Labor Market Flexibility, and Stock Returns Around the World.”
NBERWorking Paper No. 20300, National Bureau of Economic Research.
El Ghoul, S. E., O. Guedhami, C. C. Y. Kwok, and D. R. Mishra. 2011. “Does Corporate Social Responsibility Affect the Cost of
Capital?” Journal of Banking and Finance 35 (9): 2388–2406.
El Ghoul, S., and A. Karoui. 2017. “Does Corporate Social Responsibility Affect Mutual Fund Performance and Flows?” Journal of
Banking and Finance 77 (C): 53–63.
European Banking Authority. 2020. “Discussion Paper on Management and Supervision of ESG Risks for Credit Institutions and
Investment Firms.” EBA/DP/2020/03, October 30.
European Central Bank. 2020. “Guide on Climate-Related and Environmental Risks. Supervisory Expectations Relating to Risk
Management and Disclosure.” November 27.
THE EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF FINANCE 31
European Commission. 2011. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Eco-
nomic and Social Committee and theCommittee of the Regions, Brussels, 25October. https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/210
421-sustainable-finance-communication_en.
European Commission. 2018. “Action Plan: Financing Sustainable Growth, European Commission, Brussels.” March 8.
Feldman, S. J., P. A. Soyka, and P. Ameer. 1997. Does Improving a Firm’s Environmental Management System and Environmental
Performance Result in a Higher Stock Price? Fairfax, VA: Environmental Group Study, ICF Kaiser International.
Fiechter, P., J.-M. Hitz, and N. Lehman. 2020. “Real Effects of a Widespread CSR Reporting Mandate: Evidence from the European
Union’s CSR Directive.” Working Paper. Available at SSRN: 3725603.
Fiordelisi, F., D. Marques-Ibanez, and P. Molyneux. 2011. “Efficiency and Risk in European Banking.” Journal of Banking & Finance
35 (5): 1315–1326.
Freeman, R. E. 1984. Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach. Boston, MA: Pitman.
Friede, G., T. Busch, and A. Bassen. 2015. “ESG and Financial Performance: Aggregated Evidence fromMore Than 2000 Empirical
Studies.” Journal of Sustainable Finance & Investment 5 (4): 210–233.
Friedman, M. 1970. “The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits.” New York: Times Magazine, September 13,
122–124.
Gaganis, C., A. Lozano-Vivas, P. Papadimitri, and F. Pasiouras. 2020. “Macroprudential Policies, Corporate Governance and Bank
Risk: Cross-Country Evidence.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 169: 126–142.
Galbreath, J. 2013. “ESG in Focus: The Australian Evidence.” Journal of Business Ethics 118 (3): 529–541.
Gangi, F., A. Meles, E. D’Angelo, and L. M. Daniele. 2019. “Sustainable Development and Corporate Governance in the Financial
System: Are Environmentally Friendly Banks Less Risky?” Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management 26
(3): 529–547.
García-Sánchez, I. M., and E. García-Meca. 2017. “CSR Engagement and Earnings Quality in Banks. The Moderating Role of
Institutional Factors.” Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management 24 (2): 145–158.
Garriga, E., and D. Melé. 2004. “Corporate Social Responsibility Theories: Mapping the Territory.” Journal of Business Ethics 53 (1):
51–71.
Godfrey, P. C. 2005. “The Relationship Between Corporate Philanthropy and ShareholderWealth: A RiskManagement Perspective.”
The Academy of Management Review 30 (4): 777–798.
Godfrey, C., A. G. F. Hoepner, M. T. Lin, and S. H. Poon. 2020. “Women on Boards and Corporate Social Irresponsibility: Evidence
from a Granger Style Reverse Causality Minimisation Procedure.” The European Journal of Finance, 1–27.
Godfrey, P. C., C. B. Merrill, and J. M. Hansen. 2009. “The Relationship Between Corporate Social Responsibility and Shareholder
Value: An Empirical Test of the Risk Management Hypothesis.” Strategic Management Journal 30 (4): 425–445.
Goss, A., and G. S. Roberts. 2011. “The Impact of Corporate Social Responsibility on the Cost of Bank Loans.” Journal of Banking
& Finance 35 (7): 1794–1810.
Grewal, J., E. J. Riedl, and G. Serafeim. 2019. “Market Reaction toMandatory Nonfinancial Disclosure.”Management Science 65 (7):
3061–3084.
Griffin, J. J., and J. F. Mahon. 1997. “The Corporate Social Performance and Corporate Financial Performance Debate: Twenty-Five
Years of Incomparable Research.” Business and Society 36: 5–31.
Gupta, K., and C. Krishnamurti. 2018. “Does Corporate Social Responsibility Engagement Benefit Distressed Firms? The Role of
Moral and Exchange Capital.” Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 50: 249–262.
Hasan, I., N. Kobeissi, L. Liu, andH.Wang. 2018. “Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm Financial Performance: TheMediating
Role of Productivity.” Journal of Business Ethics 149: 671–688.
Hassan, M. K., A. Khan, and A. Paltrinieri. 2019. “Liquidity Risk, Credit Risk and Stability in Islamic and Conventional Banks.”
Research in International Business and Finance 48: 17–31.
Heckman, J. J. 1978. “Dummy Endogenous Variables in a Simultaneous Equation System.” Econometrics 46 (6): 931–959.
Hill, R. P., T. Ainscough, T. Shank, and D. Manullang. 2007. “Corporate Social Responsibility and Socially Responsible Investing: A
Global Perspective.” Journal of Business Ethics 70 (2): 165–174.
Ho, F. N., H. M. D. Wang, and S. J. Vitell. 2012. “A Global Analysis of Corporate Social Performance: The Effects of Cultural and
Geographic Environments.” Journal of Business Ethics 107 (4): 423–433.
Hollo, D., M. Kremer, and M. Lo Duca. 2012. “CISS – A Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress in the Financial System.” ECB
Working Paper No. 1426.
Jackson, G., J. Bartosh, E. Avetisyan, D. Kinderman, and J,S Knudsen. 2020. “Mandatory non–Financial Disclosure and its Influence
on CSR: An International Comparison.” Journal of Business Ethics 162 (2): 323–342.
Jessen, C., and D. Lando. 2015. “Robustness of Distance-to-Default.” Journal of Banking and Finance 50: 493–505.
Jiao, Y. 2010. “Stakeholder Welfare and Firm Value.” Journal of Banking and Finance 34: 2549–2561.
Johnson, R. D., and D. W. Greening. 1999. “The Effects of Corporate Governance and Institutional Ownership Types on Corporate
Social Performance.” Academy of Management Journal 42: 564–576.
Kane, A. A., L. Argote, and J. M. Levine. 2005. “Knowledge Transfer Between Groups via Personnel Rotation: Effects of Social
Identity and Knowledge Quality.” Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Processess 96 (1): 56–71.
Kim, Y., H. Li, and S. Li. 2014. “Corporate Social Responsibility and Stock Price Crash Risk.” Journal of Banking and Finance 43 (1):
1–13.
Kirkpatrick, G. 2009. The Corporate Governance Lessons from the Financial Crisis. OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends 2009/1.
32 L. CHIARAMONTE ET AL.
Konar, S., andM. A. Cohen. 2001. “Does the Market Value Environmental Performance?” Review of Economics and Statistics 83 (2):
281–289.
Laeven, L., and R. Levine. 2009. “Bank Governance, Regulation and Risk Taking.” Journal of Financial Economics 93: 259–275.
Lee, D. D., and R.W. Faff. 2009. “Corporate Sustainability Performance and Idiosyncratic Risk: A Global Perspective.” The Financial
Review 44 (2): 213–237.
Lepetit, L., E. Nys, P. Rous, and A. Tarazi. 2008. “Bank Income Structure and Risk: An Empirical Analysis of European Banks.”
Journal of Banking and Finance 32: 1452–1467.
Leung, W. S., W. Song, and J. Chen. 2019. “Does Bank Stakeholder Orientation Enhance Financial Stability?” Journal of Corporate
Finance 56: 38–63.
Levine, R. 2005. “Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence.” In Handbook of Economic Growth, Chapter 12, 1st ed., Vol. 1, edited
by P. Aghion and S. Durlauf, 865–934, Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Li, K., andN. R. Prabhala. 2007. “Self-SelectionModels in Corporate Finance.” InHandbook of Corporate Finance: Empirical Corporate
Finance, Vol. 1, edited by B. E. Eckbo, 37–86. Amsterdam: Elsevier/North-Holland.
Liang, H., and L. Renneboog, 2016. “Corporate Donations and Shareholder Value.” Working paper, Tilburg University.
Liang, H., and L. Renneboog. 2017. “On the Foundations of Corporate Social Responsibility.” The Journal of Finance LXXII (2):
853–910.
Lins, K. V., H. Servaes, and A. Tamayo. 2017. “Social Capital, Trust, and Firm Performance: The Value of Corporate Social
Responsibility During the Financial Crisis.” The Journal of Finance 72 (4): 1785–1823.
Luo, X., and C. B. Bhattacharya. 2006. “Corporate Social Responsibility, Customer Satisfaction, and Market Value.” Journal of
Marketing 70: 1–18.
Margolis, J. D., H. Elfenbein, and J. Walsh. 2009. “Does It Pay to be Good . . . and Does It Matter? A Meta-Analysis and Redirection
of Research on Corporate Social and Financial Performance.” Harvard University Working paper.
Masulis, R. W., and S. W. Reza. 2015. “Agency Problems of Corporate Philanthropy.” Review of Financial Studies 28: 592–636.
McCarthy, S., B. Oliver, and S. Song. 2017. “Corporate Social Responsibility and CEO Confidence.” Journal of Banking and Finance
75 (C): 280–291.
McGuinness, P. B., J. P. Vieito, and M. Wang. 2017. “The Role of Board Gender and Foreign Ownership in the CSR Performance of
Chinese Listed Firms.” Journal of Corporate Finance 42: 75–99.
McWilliams, A., and D. Siegel. 2001. “Corporate Social Responsibility. A Theory of the Firm Perspective.” Academy of Management
Review 26 (1): 117–127.
Mollah, S., and E. Liljeblom. 2016. “Governance and Bank Characteristics in the Credit and Sovereign Debt Crises: The Impact of
CEO Power.” Journal of Financial Stability 27: 59–73.
Nizam, E., A. N. G. Dewandaru, R. Nagayev, and M. A. Nkoba. 2019. “The Impact of Social and Environmental Sustainability on
Financial Performance: A Global Analysis of the Banking Sector.” Journal of Multinational Financial Management 49 (C): 35–53.
Oikonomou, I., C. Brooks, and S. Pavelin. 2012. “The Impact of Corporate Social Performance on Financial Risk and Utility: A
Longitudinal Analysis.” Financial Management 41 (2): 483–515.
Park, J., H. Lee, and C. Kim. 2014. “Corporate Social Responsibilities, Consumer Trust and Corporate Reputation: South Korean
Consumers’ Perspectives.” Journal of Business Research 67 (3): 295–302.
Peloza, J. 2006. “Using Corporate Social Responsibility as Insurance for Financial Performance.” California Management Review 48
(2): 52–72.
Polk, J., J. Rovny, R. Bakker, E. Edwards, L. Hooghe, S. Jolly, J. Koedam, et al. 2017. “Explaining the Salience of Anti-Elitism and
Reducing Political Corruption for Political Parties in Europe with the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey Data.” Research & Politics
4 (1): 1–9.
Roodman, D. 2009. “How to do xtabond2: An Introduction to Difference and System GMM in Stata.” The Stata Journal 9 (1):
86–136.
Rosenbaum, P., and D. Rubin. 1983. “The Central Role of the Propensity Score in Observational Studies for Causal Effects.”
Biometrika 70: 41–55.
Ruiz, B., J. A. García, and J. J. Revilla. 2016. “Antecedents and Consequences of Bank Reputation: A Comparison of the United
Kingdom and Spain.” International Marketing Review 33 (6): 781–805.
Santis, P., A. Albuquerque, and F. Lizarelli. 2016. “Do Sustainable Companies Have a Better Financial Performance? A Study on
Brazilian Public Companies.” Journal of Cleaner Production 133: 735–745.
Sassen, R., A. K. Hinze, and I. Hardeck. 2016. “Impact of ESG Factors on Firm Risk in Europe.” Journal of Business Economics 86
(8): 867–904.
Schultz, F., I. Castelló, and M. Morsing. 2013. “The Construction of Corporate Social Responsibility in Network Societies: A
Communication View.” Journal of Business Ethics 115 (4): 681–692.
Servaes, H., andA. Tamayo. 2013. “The Impact of Corporate Social Responsibility on FirmValue: The Role of CustomerAwareness.”
Management Science 59: 1045–1061.
Shen, C. H., M.W.Wu, T. H. Chen, and H. Fange. 2016. “To Engage or Not to Engage in Corporate Social Responsibility: Empirical
Evidence from Global Banking Sector.” Economic Modelling 55: 207–225.
Stulz, R.M. 2016. “RiskManagement,Governance, Culture, andRiskTaking inBanks.” Federal Reserve Bank ofNewYorkEconomic
Policy Review, August.
THE EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF FINANCE 33
Swanda Jr, J. R. 1990. “Goodwill, Going Concern, Stocks and Flows. A Prescription for Moral Analysis.” Journal of Business Ethics
9: 751–759.
Tabak, B. M., D. M. Fazio, and D. O. Cajueiro. 2012. “The Relationship Between Banking Market Competition and Risk-Taking: Do
Size and Capitalization Matter?” Journal of Banking and Finance 36 (12): 3366–3381.
Wintoki, M. B., J. S. Linck, and J. M. Netter. 2012. “Endogeneity and the Dynamics of Internal Corporate Governance.” Journal of
Financial Economics 105: 581–606.
Wu, M. W., and C. H. Shen. 2013. “Corporate Social Responsibility in the Banking Industry: Motives and Financial Performance.”
Journal of Banking and Finance 37: 3529–3547.
Zhou, G., Y. Sun, S. Lou, and J. Liao. 2021. “Corporate Social Responsibility and Bank Financial Performance in China: The






























Environmental Resource Use score Resource use category score
reflects a company’s
performance and capacity to
reduce the use of materials,
energy or water, and to find
more eco-efficient solutions
by improving supply chain
management.









in the production and
operational processes.
22 0.120 (= 22/178) 0.3529 (= 0.120/
0.340)
Innovation score Environmental innovation
category score reflects
a company’s capacity to
reduce the environmental







20 0.110 (= 20/178) 0.3235 (= 0.110/
0.340)



























































8 0.045 (= 8/178) 0.1268 (= 0.045/
0.3550)
Community score Community category score
measures the company’s
commitment towards being
a good citizen, protecting
public health and respecting
business ethics.








































score reflects a company’s
capacity to produce
quality goods and services
integrating the customer’s
health and safety, integrity
and data privacy.
12 0.070 (= 12/178) 0.1972 (= 0.070/
0.3550)















and the use of anti-takeover
devices.
12 0.070 (= 12/178) 0.2295 (= .070/
0.3050)
CSR Strategy score CSR strategy category score
reflects a company’s
practices to communicate
that it integrates the
economic (financial),
social and environmental
dimensions into its day-
to-day decision-making
processes.






TOTAL 178 1.00 1.00
ESG = (ENV∗0.3400)+
(SOC∗0.3550)+(GOV∗0.3050)
Notes: This table summarize the category scores and their weights used by Thomson Reuters’ Refinitiv database to compute the ESG score and its three components (ENV, SOC, and GOV). The ‘Category
Weights’ are determined by the number of indicators (so-called ‘Indicators in Rating’) that make up each category in comparison to all indicators used in the Thomson Reuters’ Refinitiv ESG Score
framework. This means that higher weight is assigned to themes that are more mature in terms of disclosure and the relative performance scores of companies is calculated with a higher degree
of confidence. As a result, categories that contain multiple issues with relatively higher transparency like Management (composition, diversity, independence, committees, compensation, etc.) and
companies reporting more information across these topics will have higher weight than lighter and less reported categories, such as Human Rights or CSR Strategy. The ‘Sum of Category Weights’ is
obtained by summing each category weight of respective pillars. The ‘New Category Weights’ are computed by dividing category weights to the sum of category weights of respective pillar.





















Table A2. Correlation Matrix.
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1 DTD 1
2 Z-score 0.2408∗ 1
3 ESG −0.1738∗ 0.0396 1
4 ENV −0.2728∗ −0.0124 0.8935∗ 1
5 Resource use −0.0051 −0.0209 0.5447∗ 0.5722∗ 1
6 Emission 0.0264 0.0144 0.4946∗ 0.5812∗ 0.6668∗ 1
7 Innovation −0.0783∗ −0.0652 0.3452∗ 0.3701∗ 0.4149∗ 0.3716∗ 1
8 SOC −0.1716∗ −0.0215 0.8901∗ 0.7857∗ 0.4960∗ 0.4092∗ 0.2914∗ 1
9 Workforce −0.1368∗ 0.0118 0.7507∗ 0.6657∗ 0.4141∗ 0.3624∗ 0.2141∗ 0.8709∗ 1
10 Human Rights 0.0052 −0.0751∗ 0.4465∗ 0.3709∗ 0.5011∗ 0.4059∗ 0.4064∗ 0.4203∗ 0.2718∗ 1
11 Community 0.0462 −0.0087 0.4635∗ 0.3617∗ 0.5095∗ 0.4367∗ 0.2642∗ 0.5462∗ 0.2997∗ 0.3545∗ 1
12 Product Resp. −0.0288 −0.0968∗ 0.4350∗ 0.3270∗ 0.4780∗ 0.3321∗ 0.3446∗ 0.5398∗ 0.2996∗ 0.3983∗ 0.5117∗ 1
13 GOV 0.0586 0.1504∗ 0.6584∗ 0.3437∗ 0.2373∗ 0.1844∗ 0.1703∗ 0.3614∗ 0.2697∗ 0.3035∗ 0.2195∗ 0.1906∗ 1
14 Management 0.0221 −0.0215 0.4386∗ 0.1847∗ 0.2757∗ 0.1923∗ 0.1868∗ 0.2423∗ 0.1498∗ 0.3563∗ 0.2900∗ 0.2651∗ 0.7203∗ 1
15 Shareholders 0.0168 0.0277 0.0241 −0.0631 −0.1204∗ −0.0769∗ −0.0546 −0.0945∗ −0.0412 0.0082 −0.1494∗ −0.1843∗ 0.2553∗ 0.0529
16 CSR strategy −0.0649 0.0482 0.7007∗ 0.6762∗ 0.4505∗ 0.4012∗ 0.3168∗ 0.6251∗ 0.5221∗ 0.3534∗ 0.3424∗ 0.3220∗ 0.3961∗ 0.2347∗
17 SIZE 0.0307 −0.0397∗ 0.3629∗ 0.3432∗ 0.2716∗ 0.2377∗ 0.2348∗ 0.3689∗ 0.2808∗ 0.3228∗ 0.2512∗ 0.2570∗ 0.1618∗ 0.1882∗
18 ETA 0.2156∗ 0.0227 −0.2635∗ −0.3222∗ −0.0749∗ −0.0638 −0.0741∗ −0.2798∗ −0.2451∗ −0.1083∗ −0.0153 −0.1235∗ −0.0112 −0.0763∗
19 LLR_GL −0.1180∗ −0.3935∗ −0.0459 0.0077 −0.0163 −0.0601 −0.0289 −0.0397 −0.0734 −0.0457 −0.0031 −0.0371 −0.0929∗ −0.0591
20 CIR −0.2895∗ −0.2729∗ 0.0601 0.0965∗ 0.0328 −0.0087 0.0715∗ 0.0641 0.0136 0.0614 −0.0037 0.0621 −0.0272 0.0340
21 ROAE 0.2878∗ 0.1850∗ 0.0443 −0.0215 0.0306 0.0429 −0.0438 0.0636 0.0701∗ 0.0037 0.0972∗ 0.0225 0.0788∗ 0.0339
22 CASH_TA 0.1236∗ −0.0808∗ −0.0098 0.0062 −0.0110 0.0616 −0.0311 −0.0154 0.0258 −0.0417 −0.0390 −0.0123 −0.0181 −0.0614
23 DIV −0.0132 −0.1160∗ −0.0243 0.0124 −0.0595 −0.0407 −0.0656 0.0164 0.0160 −0.0490 −0.0458 −0.0507 −0.1045∗ −0.1170∗
24 GDP_GRW 0.2581∗ 0.1411∗ −0.0737∗ −0.1301∗ 0.0015 0.0020 0.0008 −0.0644 −0.0720∗ 0.0020 0.0029 0.0021 0.0316 0.0013
25 HHI −0.0070 0.1106∗ 0.1616∗ 0.1157∗ −0.0025 −0.0030 −0.0004 0.1514∗ 0.1330∗ −0.0002 −0.0050 −0.0055 0.1349∗ −0.0028
26 CAP_REG −0.1285∗ 0.0461∗ 0.0576 0.0118 0.0054 0.0060 −0.0019 0.0326 0.0050 0.0055 0.0017 −0.0007 0.1096∗ −0.0015














Variables 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
15 Shareholders 1
16 CSR strategy −0.1217∗ 1
17 SIZE −0.0589 0.3738∗ 1
18 ETA 0.0974∗ −0.2962∗ −0.4311∗ 1
19 LLR_GL −0.0222 −0.0961∗ −0.0814∗ 0.2583∗ 1
20 CIR −0.0470 0.0299 −0.0727∗ −0.0282 0.1376∗ 1
21 ROAE 0.0223 0.0512 0.0520∗ −0.0028 −0.1697∗ −0.5334∗ 1
22 CASH_TA 0.0307 0.0106 −0.1691∗ 0.2048∗ 0.1338∗ 0.1475∗ 0.0129 1
23 DIV −0.0235 0.0005 −0.0058 0.1165∗ 0.0195 0.1734∗ −0.0646∗ 0.1499∗ 1
24 GDP_GRW −0.0016 0.0036 0.0026 0.0594∗ −0.1051∗ −0.0769∗ 0.0005 0.0496∗ 0.0140 1
25 HHI 0.0056 0.0216 0.0020 0.0466∗ −0.1152∗ −0.1217∗ 0.0017 0.0233 −0.0090 0.0281 1
26 CAP_REG −0.0021 −0.0183 −0.0001 0.0036 0.0933∗ −0.0187 −0.0019 −0.0265 −0.0101 −0.0332∗ 0.1607∗ 1
27 SUP_PWR 0.0000 −0.1570∗ −0.0018 0.0501∗ 0.0779∗ 0.0870∗ −0.0015 0.1312∗ −0.0398∗ 0.0800∗ −0.1315∗ 0.1521∗ 1
Notes: This table shows the correlation matrix of the variables used in the empirical analysis over the period 2005–2017. Variable definitions are provided in Tables 1 and A1 (in Appendix). All control
variables based on accounting data (SIZE, ETA, LLR_GL, CIR, ROAE, CASH_TA, DIV) are winsorized at the 1% of each tail. The symbol ∗ indicates statistically significance at the 5% level.
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Table A3. Sample description by country.
Country of headquarter N. of Obs. Percent
Austria 15 3%
Belgium 17 4%
















United Kingdom 32 7%
Total 439 100%
Notes: This table describes our sample by provid-
ing thebreakdownof observations at the country
level.
Figure A1. Parallel Trends. Notes: This figure illustrates the behaviour of the average one-year Merton’s Distance to Default (DTD) before and
after the shock or treatment (i.e. the publication of the Non-financial Reporting Directive 2014/95/EU in October 2014) for both the treated and
the control group. The treated (control) group is represented by banks above (below) the average values of ESG scores in the year of the shock
(2014).
